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Hake is the most valuable fisheries species in South Africa, with an estimated landed value of
R658 million in 1997. Fundamental restructuring of the South African hake fishery is however
recommended by the White Paper on Marine Fisheries Policy (1997). This study aims at
providing economic solutions to some of these problems of restructuring.
Management methods such as imposing upper limits on catches, access restriction (licenses),
input restrictions and taxes have been shown to be unsuccessful at maximising economic rent
generated by fisheries' resources. Hence the move by leading international fishing nations
towards individual transferable quota (ITQ) management. According to the White Paper, South
Africa intends pursuing very similar management techniques, to those employed by these leading
countries, and it is therefore crucial that policy makers combine international experience with
local knowledge and conditions, to draft the best possible fisheries' policy for the country.
Factor analysis of data collected from a postal survey of existing South African hake quota
holders and rejected hake quota applicants, suggests that distinct differences in attitudes towards
restructuring exist amongst respondents. Four factors, representing groups of respondents
defined as, (1) applicants, (2) quota holders, (3) small scale respondents (comprising of both
applicants and quota holders), and (4) larger, longer established quota holders, sharing similar
attitudes towards restructuring, were extracted. Applicants seem concerned with having to
compete with established business for quota, opposing any form of payment for quota.
Applicants also opted for a rapid change from the status quo, to a free and open system of
allocation, where quota is also allocated as a fixed tonnage, as opposed to a proportion of total
allowable catch (TAC). Current quota holders on the other hand, seem more concerned with
issues of self-utilisation and the effect paying for quota might have on present business
operations. Another group of respondents defined as smaller scale respondents (comprising of
both quota holders and applicants) demonstrated concern about the present imbalance in the
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industry, where a few large companies receive the majority of quota. These respondents wish
to see a rapid redistribution of quota, and a move towards a freer and open quota market.
Analysis also revealed a group defined as larger, longer established quota holders who's
primary concern seemed to be possible sudden reductions in quota allocation, and proposed
methods of payment for quota. These companies have been receiving large allocations of quota
in the past, and are therefore concerned with the impact restructuring might have on employment
and international market share and competitiveness.
Discriminant analysis revealed that the most important variable discriminating between current
quota holders and rejected applicants was grandfathering (issuing quota according to past
allocation). The second most influential variable involved new entrants paying a predetermined
price for quota, demonstrating applicants' opposition to paying for a resource which current
quota holders have been receiving free of charge in the past. Allowing new entrants the right to
on-lease quota to established operators, and the issuing of 'paper' quota, were ranked third and
fourth respectively. This highlights the opposing views of current quota holders and applicants
on the issue of new entrants receiving token allocations of quota, when they are often not in a
position to utilise it, and making a windfall gain by on-leasing to established quota holders.
A substantial annual rent of approximately R279 million is generated by the South African hake
industry, which is presently harvested free of charge by those issued with quota. These rents
appear high relative to the landed value of hake of approximately R658 million. This may be
evidence of the capital intensive nature of the hake industry, with large quota allocations needed
to sustain an economically viable operation. Extraction of these rents through auctioning should
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INTRODUCTION
Hake is the most valuable fisheries' species in South Africa, with an estimated landed value of
R658 million in 1997 (1996 landed mass has been used in conjunction with 1997 prices) (De
Swardt, 1998). At present the hake fishery, along with seven other commercial fisheries, is
managed under an individual quota system, where total allowable catch (TAC) is set annually
and divided among quota holders free of charge according to past performance (grandfathering).
Quota allocated under the present system is also only valid for one year.
International experiences in fisheries' management suggest that methods such as imposing an
upper limit on catches, access restriction (licenses), input restrictions and taxes are often
successful from a biological point of view at reducing over-exploitation, but unsuccessful from
an economic point of view at maximising economic rent. Most leading fishing nations, including
New Zealand, Australia, Iceland, Chile and Norway have therefore opted to do away with these
management methods, and pursue a trend towards individual transferable quota (ITQ)
management.
The present system employed in the South African hake fishery is in line with many leading
international rights based management principles, however it involves a high degree of
government intervention in allocating fishing rights. This has been identified by industry
members as one of the reasons for the continued dominance of the industry by five 'pioneer'
companies (of which two companies are by far the largest). These companies receive in excess
of 80 percent of total annual hake quota allocation (Stuttaford, 1997). All quota is almost
exclusively harvested by these five companies, catching their own allocations, as well as
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harvesting on behalf of other smaller members of the industry. This, together with inter alia, the
short term nature of tenure presently associated with quota, forced cuts in allocation to existing
quota holders (to facilitate the introduction of new participants), and token allocations of quota
to those 'previously excluded from the industry', has led to great dissatisfaction from within and
outside the industry. This has prompted policy makers to formulate a new national marine
fisheries policy, which at the time of printing had not been passed by Parliament.
A postal survey of existing quota holders, ranging from large vertically integrated companies to
smaller processing and marketing operations, together with individuals attempting to enter the
industry, in the form of rejected applicants, was therefore conducted. Attitudes towards current
and future policy, methods of restructuring, and the present level of activity of the quota rental
market were assessed and analysed. Discriminant analysis was also used to identify those
variables which best differentiate between present quota holders and rejected hake applicants.
The study also endeavours to calculate the annual rent generated by the hake fishery, as it is a
stated White Paper objective to capture these rents. Proposed White Paper methods of
accomplishing this have however not been well accepted by the industry.
Chapter one deals with the theory of institutions, with the intention of emphasising efficiency
criteria in dealing with the common ownership problems faced by fisheries' resources. Chapter
two reviews literature on international fisheries' management methods, focussing on
management methods employed by leading fishing nations. Chapter three examines the South
African hake industry, giving a brief history of its development, present structure and
management. Chapter four describes the research methodology used in the study, and Chapter
five presents the results obtained from a factor and discriminant analysis of data collected.
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Chapter six concludes by emphasising the policy implications of the empirical findings, and
suggests possible ways in which a new fisheries policy might meet economic efficiency criteria,
while at the same time giving consideration to aspects of equity.
CHAPTER 1
INSTITUTIONS AND THE COMMON OWNERSHIP PROBLEMS FACED BY
FISHERIES' RESOURCES
This chapter begins with a comparative analysis of the neo-classical and institutional approaches
that deal with matters of economic efficiency. This is followed by a section on the common
ownership problems faced by fisheries' resources, with particular reference to open access (or
uncontrolled common ownership) and private ownership scenarios. The overview is not intended
to provide a comprehensive review of the theory, but rather to emphasise those issues relevant
to the efficient utilisation and allocation of marine resources, in the context of the present South
African situation.
1.1 Economic Efficiency: Neo-classical and Institutional Approach
The theory of institutions, and their relevance to a changing environment, are dealt with in this
section. Allocative efficiency and equity, within the bounds of these institutions, play a major
role in determining which management approach is best suited to the restructuring of the South
African hake fishery.
1.1.1 Institutions Defined
The effect of property rights structures and transaction costs on economic incentive and
behaviour, has resulted in renewed interest in the theory of institutions (Furubotn and Richter,
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1991). Definitions of institutions have converged over time with many elements in common.
An institution is defined as the set of behavioural rules that govern a particular pattern of actions
and relationships in society (Ruttan, 1978). Commons (1931) defines institutions as the outcome
of collective action which constrains individuals' choices or bargaining through customs and
laws. Commons contends that due to scarcity, there is a conflict of interests in human
relationships. These conflicts are bargained out by goal-seeking individuals, who use whatever
power they have been granted, to achieve goals which are influenced by future expectations
(Miller, 1978). Institutions comprise rules and conventions that determine the behaviour of
individuals with respect to one another (Runge, 1984; North, 1990). These rules may be self
policed or policed by outside agents (Schotter, 1981). The way in which institutions are
formulated and enforced make up the legal system of that society (Bromley and Cochrane, 1994).
In the area of economic relations, institutions have the crucial role of establishing expectations
about the rights to resource use in economic activities, and about the distribution of income
streams resulting from economic activity (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985). However, the right to a
benefit stream defined by a property institution, is only as secure as the duty of others to respect
the conditions that protect that stream (Bromley and Cochrane, 1994). If the state is unwilling
or unable to protect an individual's rights, then the rights are worthless.
Institutions have a profound effect on the behaviour and future expectations of individuals. In
essence, the effectiveness of a particular property institution in manifesting economic incentives
that encourage desired behaviour, depends on two prerequisites; (1) how exclusively property
rights are defined, and (2) how well transaction costs have been curtailed (Nieuwoudt, 1990).
1.1.2 Property Rights Defined
Modern institutional economics focuses on the institution of property, and the rules governing
property rights (Furubotn and Richter, 1991). Property rights are a particular characteristic of
property institutions, a subset of all institutions (Runge, 1985). Property rights reflect the norms
of behaviour with respect to things that people must observe in their interactions with others, or
bear the consequences of non-observance (Furubotn and Richter, 1991; Pejovich, 1990).
Property rights reduce uncertainty by providing individuals with information that allows them
to form more predictable expectations in their interactions with others (Demsetz, 1967; Runge,
1984).
Property rights are therefore an endogenous response to the need for economic coordination in
the face of inter-dependence, and together with the market, serve to reduce real resource losses
faced by individuals as a result of imperfect information or uncertainty. These losses are grouped
together under the term 'transaction costs'. Dahlman (1979: 148) define transaction costs in a
very similar manner as,"... the cost of making and enforcing a decision. Included are the costs
of obtaining information, establishing one's bargaining position, bargaining and arriving at a
group decision, and enforcing the decision made".
Property rights also play a crucial role in conveying returns of economic activity to the relevant
agent. The initial allocation of property rights however, determines the distribution of income
and wealth in society, as it determines who will benefit from a particular flow of income
generated by the utilisation of resources. If transaction costs are positive, property rights will not
transfer costlessly, and efficiency and equity are not separable.
1.1.3 Neo-classical Economic Approach
Neo-classical economists are largely concerned with the allocation of resources in a market
economy, and the operation of demand and supply within that market. The neo-classical
paradigm takes institutions as given, often applying Walrasian general equilibrium systems
without regard for the complex institutions on which contracts in real world markets crucially
depend (Bardhan, 1983). Price and quantity in the market are determined by equating supply and
demand, and discounting imperfect information and uncertainty. When the market equilibrium
is disturbed, in the Walrasian model, a new equilibrium is instantaneously restored because
transaction costs are assumed to be zero. Prices alone are sufficient to ensure that resources are
allocated to their highest valued use, and economic efficiency is ensured (Barzel, 1989). Under
these highly idealised conditions, optimising behaviour by market participants brings about the
most productive pattern of resource use for the entire economy (Pasour, 1990).
According to the neo-classical approach, economic efficiency is measured using the criterion of
Pareto optimality (Arrow, 1985). Pareto efficiency is achieved when an individual's position
cannot be improved without causing a deterioration in the position of another individual. The
assumption of zero transaction costs takes the initial distribution of property rights as irrelevant,
as these rights can be voluntarily and costlessly transferred to reach a new Pareto efficient
allocation of rights (Coase, 1960). Consequently, the concepts of efficiency and equity become
separable if the neo-classical assumptions hold (Bardhan, 1983). The shortfall of Pareto criteria
is that it assumes the existing distribution of wealth, and the existing distribution of rights, is
morally acceptable, ie., the prevailing property institutions are therefore regarded as exogenous
to the economic system (Ruttan, 1978).
1.1.3.1. Limitations of the Neo-classical Model
1) Transaction costs
Coase (1960) states that regardless of the initial allocation of property rights, an efficient
equilibrium will be reached in the market, provided the property rights are well defined and
transaction costs are zero. While property rights provide information, and thereby reduce
transaction costs faced by individuals, the process of defining and enforcing property rights is not
costless, and information is scarce. In order for goods to be exchanged and realise their highest
market value, property rights must be comprehensively defined (Furubotn and Richter, 1991).
With non-zero transaction costs, rights pertaining to a good are not fully known, and exchange
that would otherwise improve resource allocation may not take place (Coase, 1988). By the neo-
classical approach ignoring transaction costs, it ignores a fundamental feature of reality (Furubotn
and Richter, 1991).
2) Equity
The Pareto optimality criteria used by neo-classical economists ignores the initial distribution of
property rights, thereby handicapping this supposedly value-free measure. In the presence of
transaction costs, efficiency and equity cannot be separated, and the flow of benefits from
resources depends on who originally owns the resource (Bardhan, 1983). Pareto optimality is
thus not free of ethical judgements, since it is based on the assumption that the existing
distribution of rights is morally acceptable.
1.1.4 Institutional Economics Approach
Having shown that the conventional neo-classical efficiency standards are unsatisfactory in real
world situations, it is necessary to go beyond this ideological approach to include property
institutions as endogenous variables in the economic system. The institutional approach
therefore endeavours to extend the scope of neo-classical economics, by considering how
institutions and transaction costs affect individual incentives and economic behaviour (Furubotn
andRichter, 1991).
Economic agents have different perceptions of transaction costs and benefits attached to any
market exchange of rights. The revealed choice behaviour of parties to potential exchange, is the
only source of valuation of assets. Buchanan (1986) states there is no method whereby an
external observer can determine whether or not observed levels of exchange stop short of an
'efficient' norm. As long as exchange is voluntary in a legal market situation, efficiency of
resource use within an institutional setting is ensured. The implication is that resource allocation
is dependent upon institutional arrangement, and that efficiency is only comparable between
institutions and not within an institution.
Buchanan (1986) suggests that agreement is the ultimate test of efficiency. He argues that
agreement on a change in the rules within which exchange is allowed to take place would be a
signal that the previous rules were less preferred. However, it must be noted that resource
allocation prior to institutional change was efficient given the constraints of that institution.
Behaviour of the person who operated within the old set of rules was limited by the rules of that
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institution. As such, institutional economics extends the neo-classical approach to include the
reciprocal exchange of liberties (Buchanan, 1991).
1.2 Common Ownership Problems Faced by Fisheries' Resources
Fisheries are not the only natural resources to suffer the potential adverse effects of
uncontrollable common ownership. Pioneering work in the field of fisheries' economics was
conducted by Gordon (1954), Scott (1955), Turvey (1967) and Smith (1968), who realised that
the issue was no longer whether fisheries' resources should be managed, but rather what
management regime was best suited to a particular fishery type.
Hardin (1968) focussed attention on the difference between open access {res nullius) and
common ownership {res communis). Open access refers to the situation where everybody and
anybody is free to use the resource as they please. In the case of open access, there is no
economic incentive to invest in the future productivity of the resource, as this investment will be
dissipated between an uncontrollable number of users. Common property, on the other hand,
refers to a resource which is commonly owned by the community or set group of people. In this
case, access is regulated by the rules of the community, and although not an ideal environment
for investment, it is more beneficial for resource conservation than open access (Tisdell, 1991).
To understand the over-harvesting problem faced by fisheries' resources, the competitive
equilibrium position of an open access fishery is illustrated in Figure 1.1. Aggregate fishing
effort is measured along the horizontal axis and denoted by E, and costs and revenues are
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measured along the vertical axis. The total revenue (TR) curve represents total sustainable
revenue at different levels of effort. At low catch levels, ie., the early development stage of a
fishery, the curve illustrates that returns increase, albeit at a decreasing rate, with increased levels
of effort. The curve eventually reaches a maximum (at E**), and tapers off as fish stocks become












Figure 1.1: A comparative static model of a fishery (Kula, 1994: 50)
The equilibrium point, under an open access situation, is reached at E2. At this point the fishery
is said to have reached maturity, ie., TC equal TR, profits are zero, and there is no further
expansion or contraction in fishing effort. At this point, however, there are no net economic
returns (rents) to the fishery and the same catch (revenue) can be achieved with less effort at
effort level El (Kula, 1994).
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Maximum net returns are attained if fishing effort is reduced to level E*, where the distance
between the TR and TC curves is greatest. In order to find this point, the TC curve is moved in
a parallel fashion towards the TR curve until it is tangent to it, point E*. At this point the slope
of the TR curve (marginal revenue) equals the slope of the TC curve (marginal cost). The
economic criterion, the optimum sustainable yield (OSY), also referred to as the maximum
economic yield (MEY) or optimum economic yield (OEY), aims to identify the level of fishing
effort which yields maximum economic rent. At this level, fish stocks are at a sustainable level,
ie., increased fishing effort is not required each successive season to maintain the current catch,
and fish stocks are therefore extracted at a minimum cost to the industry (Arnason, 1992a). An
increase in effort beyond E* is undesirable because, for each additional unit of effort, the
additional cost exceeds the additional revenue (Kula, 1994). This is however not what happens
in practice, because under open access conditions, any level of profit realised encourages an
increase in fishing effort.
Under open access conditions (or uncontrolled common ownership), anyone is able to enter the
fishery and catch fish, or by the same token, existing members are free to increase catches.
Under these conditions, fishers will compare the price offish, or average revenue (AR), with the
average cost (AC) of catching fish, when deciding whether or not to enter the fishery. As long
as the price (AR) exceeds AC, they will enter. The existence of economic rents will therefore
be responsible for attracting more and more fishers into the fishery. Under these conditions,
fishers will continue to enter the fishery until AR = AC or TR = TC, point E2. At this point, no
economic rents are generated, and fishers together with society as a whole, bear the cost
(opportunity cost) of revenue forgone due to poor management of the resource.
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One of two scenarios often results in fisheries of this nature. Scenario one assumes that entry is
stopped at effort level E2. Due to increases in the cost of fishing, the TC curve shifts upwards.
This widens the gap between the TR and TC curves, and a net loss of (TC - TR) occurs.
Alternatively, in scenario two, the TC curve remains unchanged, but the price of fish falls. This
would cause the TR curve to shrink inwards towards the X-axis, resulting in the same outcome,
with TC exceeding TR, and a net loss resulting once again.
The response of fishers under these conditions should be to reduce fishing effort, either by some
members leaving the fishery, or existing members reducing their catches, and by so doing restore
the equilibrium to where TR = TC. This reduction, however, seldom happens in reality, and a
number of reasons can be cited; (1) fishermen and women establish themselves in a tightly knit
community and are very reluctant to leave and seek a livelihood elsewhere, (2) skills (human
capital) developed by fishers may not be easily transferable to other sectors of the economy, and
(3) other capital, in the form of fishing equipment and vessels, cannot be readily withdrawn and
put to work in other sectors of the economy (Kula, 1994).
This ever worsening spiral of events often characterises open access or poorly controlled
common property fisheries. The result being that poor communities get even poorer. It is
ironically the poorly applied, or failed, management regime that gets blamed for the collapse of
the fishery, when in fact it is the absence of stricter application and control of proposed
management methods, that is sorely needed.
Many South African fisheries, although perhaps not the hake fishery, are faced with such a
scenario. Management methods require vast reductions in the present level of utilisation to be
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successful at breaking the spiral towards an even worse case scenario. This can be achieved
either by present members decreasing their harvesting practices, or by some members exiting the
fishery in pursuit of alternative employment.
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CHAPTER 2
A LITERATURE REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT
A literature review of available management methods was conducted with the intention of
identifying methods suitable for the optimum management of South Africa's hake fishery.
Optimum management in the context of the present situation in South Africa does not only entail
providing a sustainable stock of fish for future generations, but also for maximising economic
returns to present generations at a time when equity considerations weigh heavily against
efficiency criteria.
2.1 Fishery Management Methods
2.1.1 Imposing an Upper Limit on Catches
According to Wilen (1992), the biological control method of setting a total allowable catch
(TAC), or upper limit, on the quantity of fish harvested in a particular season, is the minimum
standard to which a management regime ought to be held. Arnason (1992a) states further that
the TAC method works well to protect fish stocks but is unsuccessful at ensuring the
economically efficient harvesting of fish stocks. Even if fish stocks increase due to TAC
management, competition amongst fishers for a share of the TAC will result in increased fishing
effort, and over- capitalisation by fishing firms. More and improved vessels and equipment will
be purchased, and fishing effort will expand until all potential rents are dissipated.
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Setting and enforcing biological fishery restrictions is invariably difficult and costly, and because
this method captures no rent or economic profits to speak of, these costs represent a net loss.
Biological management is therefore only recommended if it is the only alternative to the
destruction of fish stocks (Arnason, 1992a)
2.1.2 Access Restriction
The most common method of restricting access is by means of licenses. 'License', in this case,
refers to 'access' license, which gives the owner the right to participate in a fishery at a chosen
level of effort. This should not be confused with the right to harvest a particular level of catch.
Access restriction, in the form of limiting the number of licenses, is an attempt to reduce fishing
mortality, or harvesting levels, by limiting the number of fishing vessels. However, even from
a biological perspective of conserving fish stocks, fishing mortality and fishing effort are seldom
equivalent. Effort is produced, not only by the number of vessels, but by factors such as vessel
size, engine type and horsepower, amount and type of gear, number of crew and time spent
fishing (Waters, 1991).
Access restriction results in 'capital stuffing' (the enlarged fishing power of vessels by expanding
unrestricted components) in a race to catch available fish stocks (Rettig, 1984). This method
needs to be used in tandem with restrictions on input (or capacity) expansion, in order to correct
the resultant distortion in resource allocation. Licenses do not eliminate the common property
problem, they merely convert open access scenarios into common property situations, which
under extensive conditions at sea, where exclusivity and control are almost impossible, are very
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similar. Consequently, access restrictions are not seen as a biologically or economically viable
solution to fishery management (Gullard and Correz, 1968).
2.1.3 Input Restrictions
Input restrictions, as opposed to access restrictions discussed above, aim to control the method
of fishing and not the number of fishing units. However, potential gains from input restrictions,
in the biological sphere, are eroded by having to control the use of all inputs, to avoid making
the use of one input more attractive than another (Campbell and Haynes, 1990). There are a
variety of different regulatory measures aimed at restricting specific inputs, such as; (1) limiting
methods of harvesting, (2) closing certain sensitive areas and seasons, (3) limiting types of gear
(mostly in the form of limitations on nets and mesh size), and (4) limiting total effort expelled
on fishing (often in the form of labour limitations). All these methods have an inherent
weakness, in that any limitation can simply be avoided, and the identical outcome obtained by
changing the resource mix in favour of a non-restricted input.
Input restrictions may however be applicable in those fisheries where control is a problem, and
monitoring of catches is difficult in both geographical and financial terms. Output charges and
quota restrictions (still to be discussed) are therefore not applicable under these circumstances,
and the situation of "some control is better than none" prevails. In these extreme cases where
no infrastructure exists to control and monitor catches, and/or control costs attached to alternative
management methods are excessively high, input restrictions can be defended. The reason being,
that economic benefits might outweigh the cost of higher input charges, brought about by
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regulations resulting in fishers not having the freedom to choose the most economical resource
mix applicable to a particular harvesting operation (Tisdell, 1991).
Access restrictions and input restrictions create an ever increasing spiral of management needs
in an effort to close loopholes uncovered by fishers. Each regulatory adjustment offers temporary
relief to fish stocks, but over time, additional effort will create the need for still more restrictions
(Waters, 1991; Gardner, 1995).
2.1.4 Taxes
Crutchfield (1961) maintains that taxes are theoretically the ultimate technique to ensure efficient
utilisation of resources. In theory, a tax exactly equivalent to the unpaid resource rent, would
make private factor costs equal to social costs, by altering the economic conditions of fishing
firms, and thereby inducing them to behave in a socially optimal fashion (Arnason, 1992a).
However, determining the precise magnitude of such a tax would require vast amounts of
information, with authorities having to solve the social optimality problem as well as each firm's
profit maximising function (Arnason, 1990).
There are many different types of corrective taxes that could be employed for this purpose, but
broadly speaking they can be classified into four categories:
(1) Taxes on fishing inputs will generally lead to a substitution away from taxed inputs to inputs
that are not taxed. But, due to the fact that inputs are not perfectly substitutable in the real world,
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this method will generate some economic rents in the form of State collected taxes (Campbell
andHaynes, 1990).
(2) Taxing catches or output is however a far more effective means of capturing the potential
economic benefits of a fishery. The direct effect of a tax of this nature is to make the fishery less
profitable. Thus, a tax of this nature reduces aggregate fishing effort by forcing less efficient
harvesters to exit the industry. Therefore, in theory, by adjusting the tax, effort levels in the
fishery can be adjusted to meet efficiency criteria (be it biological or economic) (Arnason,
1992a). Campbell and Haynes (1990), however, points out that any difference between the tax
charged and the actual rent generated by the fishery will cause a departure from the optimum
level of fishing. He continues to say that output and input based charges also have the inherent
weakness of not being related to profitability, and it is profitability which should indicate the
amount of rent in the fishery. The price offish could fall so that rents are diminished, but the
output charge would remain constant, and still have to be paid. If output and input charges were
to reflect profitability, then the amounts (percentage or fixed) would have to be negotiated at
frequent intervals. The negotiation process would be costly for both industry and administration
(Campbell and Haynes, 1990).
(3) Profit based taxes are less distorting than input based charges, as they reflect the rent level
more accurately. Profitability (and therefore the tax), can be measured by examining financial
statements submitted for tax purposes. The tax levy can therefore be charged at the same time
as individual or income tax, as a percentage of profits. Tax measured for these purposes,
however, is not necessarily the same as economic profit. For example, depreciation may be
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greater or smaller than allowed for by the State, and interest payment deductions may also distort
true profit levels.
(4) Another alternative profit based tax, and a more neutral one, is on net cash flow. Problems
encountered with depreciation are avoided since capital expenditure is deductible as and when
it occurs. Interest is also not treated as a cash expense, hi some years, cash flow will be negative
because of capital expenditure, changes in stock abundance, or price changes. The property of
neutrality, and therefore of no loss of economic efficiency, that a net cash flow charge has, will
be retained only if the negative cash flows are used to offset positive flows in other years. Any
negative cash flows carried forward should also be compounded by the relevant interest rate to
reflect the time value of money.
Fishers as well as politicians, however, dislike the idea of taxes and for this reason, along with
high administrative costs, taxes are not seen as a viable management option and have not been
applied in any significant ocean fishery (Cassidy, 1973; Arnason, 1992a).
2.1.5 Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs)
ITQs have been widely heralded as the future in fishery management (Christy, 1973; Moloney
and Pearse, 1979; Major, 1991). With this technique, an annual TAC is set and then divided up
amongst quota holders according to the proportion of quota held by the individual or company.
Quota holders then allocate their time and capital in the most cost effective manner, taking their
share of the TAC at minimum cost (Hannesson, 1992a; Dewees, 1989). The minimum cost point
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will only be aimed for in the sense that the opportunity cost of the quota rent is included
(Nieuwoudt, 1998).
For these goals to be realised, however, the property rights must display three major
characteristics; (1) security and durability, (2) exclusivity, and (3) transferability (Neher, 1996;
Grafton, 1996). Security and durability enables fishers to conserve fish for harvest in future
years, exclusivity minimises rush and unnecessary competition, and transferability ensures TAC
is taken at the socially optimal level, as quota gravitates from less efficient to more efficient users
(Randall, 1981).
Crothers (1988) concludes that the system of ITQ management can be credited with the following
advantages and benefits:
* improved biological status of the resource;
* secure access to the resource (because rights are long term, if not permanent, and forward
planning can be undertaken with confidence that access to the resource will not be
withdrawn in the future);
* a market-orientated industry structured by market forces;
* reduced over-capitalisation;
* greater industry freedom, flexibility and responsibility;
* minimal government intervention;
* improved industry efficiency, competitiveness and profitability.
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Pearse (1991) adds to this list, "improved economic returns to both the fishing industry and
government", made possible by the rent capturing capacity of the ITQ system. At the same time,
pressure is reduced on fisheries' management, so as to enable rationalisation of management
structures employed and compensated by the State. Dewees (1989) also points out the shift from
quantity to quality orientated harvesting. This is a result of guaranteed access to the resource.
Fishers no longer have to race to catch the available stock offish, and therefore employ methods
which increase the landed value offish (quality) as opposed to increasing the landed mass offish
(quantity).
Achieving a sustainable management policy is in itself a difficult task, with all the above
management alternatives applicable to specific fishery characteristics. South Africa's major
fisheries currently operate under a system of individual quotas and this system has been
particularly successful in rebuilding depleted hake stocks. However, determining who is entitled
to these rights and how they should be allocated so as to be equitable and fair to all parties, is a
monumental task. Information on the latter is contained in section 2.2 that follows, in the form
of a literature review of alternative management strategies adopted around the world.
2.2 International Experience in Fishery Management
The purpose of this section is to provide details of management practices used in other countries
adopting similar methods to those employed in the South African hake fishery. It is recognised
that South Africa is in the rather unique situation of having to restructure a fishery that is
presently performing well in both biological and economic terms. However, valuable lessons can
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be learnt from countries which have already undertaken transformation to a formal rights based
management system.
2.2.1 Initial Quota Allocation Criteria and Tenure Period
The initial allocation of quota is a potentially controversial topic, and the legitimacy and stability
of the system hinges on the fair initial allocation of these rights. Initial allocation has however
been handled in a similar manner by most countries presently using the method of individual
quota rights or ITQs.
New Zealand allocated quotas according to historical catch records (Boyd and Dewees, 1991)
and the system is supplemented with an elaborate appeal mechanism (Annala, 1996). In
Australia's southern bluefin tuna fishery, a formula for weighting the catch history and
investment commitments is used to determine the initial allocation (Kennedy and Watkins,
1985). In both Australia and New Zealand quotas were initially distributed free of charge and
in perpetuity, and there is limited taxation of catches or of quota held. In New Zealand previous
plans to impose a resource rent tax have been shelved, and the fishery now pays only a small part
of its management costs. In Australia it is a stated policy objective that fisheries should pay for
their own management (Hannesson, 1992b).
In Iceland quota is allocated to vessels according to historical catches by means of two formats;
(1) according to the vessel's catch in a certain base year, or (2) the vessel's average share of TAC
over a three year period prior to ITQ introduction. Quotas were not sold, but issued free of
charge with a small annual fee to cover enforcement and allocation costs (Arnason, 1992b).
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In Norway TAC is divided between two groups; (1) vessels which exceeded a certain catch in
one of the preceding three years were issued quota according to the size of their vessel (smaller
vessels benefit from the system, as quota is issued according to the length of vessel, but a vessel
twice the size of another vessel will receive less than twice the size quota), and (2) vessels not
exceeding a certain catch were included in a group which fish from a common quota (Hannesson,
1992b). The vessel quotas were based on the length of the vessel, so that all vessels within a
certain length category are allocated the same quota. This is a noteworthy departure from normal
practices employed by other countries in allocating quota. The Norwegian quota allocations were
designed in this way for reasons of fairness. It was felt that using the physical characteristics of
the boat as a criterion would ensure that everybody was treated equally. But this system clearly
discriminates against those that, for whatever reason, manage to do better than others with a
given outfit, particularly since the transfer of quota between vessels was explicitly forbidden.
The rationale for encouraging transfers is that if quota is transferable, quota will transfer to those
who are able to extract a greater profit with a given outfit, and both buyer and seller would profit
through bilateral negotiation. For this reason, the quota rules in the cod fishery are accused of
paying no attention to economic efficiency. All the emphasis was put on fairness, or rather one
definition of fairness. The system has since been relaxed and transfers of quota are now
permitted (Hannesson, 1992a).
In Chile, rights to fish certain resources are allocated by auctioning ITQs. A certain percentage
of the ITQ then relapses to the government each year and must be repurchased. These ITQs may
be divided, transferred, sold and rented (Bergh and Barkai, 1993).
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2.2.2 Annual Allocation of TAC: Proportional vs Fixed Tonnage
TAC can be divided up amongst quota holders in one of two ways; (1) quota is issued as a
proportion (or percentage) of TAC, and (2) quota is allocated as a fixed tonnage that does not
vary from year to year in line with fish stock fluctuations.
In New Zealand, ITQs were initially allocated as a specific tonnage. According to this system,
annual TACs were to be increased or decreased (to be in line with biological stock assessments)
by government entering the market and either buying or selling quota. When the ITQ system was
introduced, it was proposed that a 'revolving fund', derived from resource rentals and quota
sales, be created and used to buy-back this quota. This fund was however never created and
resulted in taxpayers having to foot the bill of NZ$ 45 million, as government was forced to buy-
back excess quota as a result of incorrect stock assessments (when ITQs were first issued). This
prompted government to change to a proportional system of allocation to avoid the State having
to step in and buy-back quota in years of decreased TACs (Annala, 1996).
The flexibility of ITQs has also been used to buy quota to settle Maori claims on historic fishing
rights (Bergh and Barkai, 1993). This came about when government expanded ITQ management
to include all commercially significant species, a move which Maori tribes found unacceptable.
Legal action was taken by the Maori to ensure their traditional rights to certain fisheries'
resources. This led to great uncertainty in the industry with regards to both their existing
property rights and the future implementation of ITQ management.
26
The dispute was however resolved by negotiations between government and the Maori which led
to a settlement including inter alia the following conditions:
* 50 percent of New Zealand's largest fishing company, which had 25 percent of total
allocated fish quota, transferring to Maori control;
* the transfer of 20 percent of all quota, for new species entering ITQ management, to the
Maori;
* regulations to recognise and provide for the customary food gathering of the Maori, and
prohibit the commercial harvesting of stocks in traditionally sacred Maori areas.
The settlement provided for the transfer of NZ $500 million in assets to the Maori, giving them
close to 40 percent control of the New Zealand commercial fishery (with the potential of
acquiring a larger proportion of the resource with the funds provided by the settlement). The
settlement made the Maori the single largest player in the fishing industry (Annala, 1996). It also
protected the livelihood of existing quota holders by bringing security to the commercial fishing
industry. The settlement prevented the Maori from advancing further commercial fisheries'
claims, and ensured that the management of fisheries was not compromised by the Maori acting
contrary to sustainable management practices.
This has important implications and lessons for South Africa, as it presently tackles many of the
same problems already experienced by New Zealand. As Boyd and Dewees (1991) point out,
the New Zealand government assumed it had the constitutional right to allocate quota in
perpetuity (ie., that it 'owned' the right on behalf of the nation). However, Maori claims on
fishing rights had not been fully resolved, and as a result, all rights issued without the prior
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resolution of this problem faced uncertainty in terms of long term security. Quota holders feared
their rights would be eroded by Maori claims, and as a result, rights issued in the long term, or
in perpetuity, did not have the property of secure tenure required to encourage investment and
conservation.
In Iceland, quota is issued according to the proportion of the TAC held by a particular vessel.
Each eligible vessel is then issued a share of TAC, which is permanent, divisible and fully
transferable (Arnason, 1992b).
In Norway, quota allocation is calculated by multiplying the fleet's TAC by the vessel's base
quota (which is determined by licensed cargo capacity, ie., size or length of each vessel) and
dividing by the sum of the base quota, ie., a proportional system (Hannesson, 1992a).
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CHAPTER 3
THE SOUTH AFRICAN HAKE INDUSTRY
This chapter begins with an introduction to the South African fishing industry as a whole. The
chapter then continues with a brief history of the hake fishery, culminating in the present day
structure of the hake quota register. Management methods presently employed in the hake
fishery are then discussed, with the intention of contrasting them with those used by leading
fishing nations. The chapter concludes with a very brief overview of proposed White Paper
reforms, indicative of the direction government intends pursuing.
3.1 Introduction
South Africa's 200 mile (320 km) exclusive economic zone (EEZ) stretches some 3000 km from
the Orange River mouth in the north-west to Ponta do Ouro on the Mozambique border in the
north-east. More than 90 percent of the value and tonnage of the commercial fishery is however
landed on the west and south coast of South Africa. In 1993, the total annual South African
fishery landing (for all species) was about 0.7 percent (550 000 tons per year) of the total world
catch (approximately 80 million tons per year). South Africa ranked 29th and 31st as a marine
fishing nation in 1990 and 1991 respectively, but good catches in 1992 elevated it to 22nd position
(South African Commercial Sea Fisheries Review, 1993). The wholesale value of South African
landings in 1993 was over one billion rand, roughly two percent of South Africa's gross domestic
product. The demersal fishery (bottom dwelling species) is by far the most commercially
29
valuable fishery. Although it only accounts for 35 percent of total tonnage landed, it makes up
50 percent of the wholesale value and is dominated by hake which is South Africa's main export
earner in the fisheries' sector (Bergh and Barkai, 1993).
The majority of South Africa' s fish stocks are not protected by a TAC at present. Only seven
species are under the control of a rights based management system, where TAC is set and divided
up among quota holders. These stocks include Hake, Sole, Pilchards, Anchovy, West Coast
Rock Lobster, South Coast Rock Lobster and Abalone (Stuttaford, 1996). The hake industry will
be discussed further, as the study focuses on the hake fishery, with the hope that lessons learnt
in the hake fishery can help in the restructuring and development of other fisheries.
3.2 History of the South African Hake Industry
Up until 1905 there was little demand for hake in the South African fish market, and hake was
therefore not exploited to any great extent. The 'pre-industriaF fishermen of the Western Cape
landed a mix of species made up of mostly snoek, and hake was landed in very modest quantities.
The stable nature of the hake resource and its all-year availability, however, made it an ideal
target for steam trawlers.
The South African industrial trawl fishery was based on steam power and originated in 1904 in
Cape Town, with the formation of African Fishing and Trading Co. by G. D. Irvin. The company
soon failed, but picked itself up again by entering into a co-operative with C. 0. Johnson, then
fishing out of Durban. This new co-operative also lost its original capital within the first two
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years. Further capital was however procured and the two pioneers entered into partnership in
1910, merged as Irvin and Johnson (I&J) in 1912/13, and registered as a public company in 1922.
Between the years 1910 and 1960, the industry witnessed a constant flow of new entrants,
liquidations, amalgamations and take-overs. A number of people and companies did however
manage to survive in the inshore trawl sector (to be discussed later), the primary reason put
forward being that the inshore trawl sector is less capital intensive than deep sea trawl.
By 1960 the development of the trawling industry had become static. It seemed the struggle for
the domestic market had been decided and the industry had settled into a natural monopoly.
Things were however soon to change radically regarding both market structure and resource
productivity. Amalgamated Fisheries (later Atlantic Trawling) was the first newcomer to enter
the domestic market in 1963, followed closely by Kaap Kunene with five large ships, including
the first freezer ship. Sea Harvest Corporation emerged in 1964 as a major force by virtue of its
capital resources and the marketing and catching abilities of its parent companies (Atlantic
Trawling being one). Marine Products, another one of the present five large operators, emerged
in 1965.
The foreign 'discovery' of the south east Atlantic hake fishery occurred in 1963, and severe over-
exploitation plunged the industry into crisis, the after-effects of which still remain today. The
countries involved included Japan, Spain and many of the ex-socialist countries. The 200 mile
EEZ was instituted in November 1977, and brought this pillaging of Southern Africa's marine
resource to a long awaited end. The damage had however been done, and the South African hake
catch in the south-east Atlantic had fallen to 15 percent of its previous total.
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A pilot domestic TAC was set for 1978 (separate TACs were set for the inshore and deep sea
trawl fisheries), but it was widely realised that a 'global quota' was ineffective. Capital resident
in the industry crept upwards as participants competed to improve their position in anticipation
of the final step in the evolution of rights. Company quotas were introduced in the deep sea trawl
industry in 1979, the three 'foundation' companies (I&J, Atlantic Trawling and Sea Harvest)
receiving 95 percent of the domestic TAC with the balance to three newly established smaller
enterprises. The 28 small inshore boat owners, that traditionally trawled for sole in addition to
hake, affiliated and have kept a separate identity since 1978. These trawler owners received
individual quotas in 1982.
The familiar cycle of business failure and consolidation continued even during this more stable
phase, and the control of two-thirds of the deep sea trawl industry quota changed hands in the
period 1979 to 1983. The advent of a new minister in 1984 brought with it a new policy. Quota
was reallocated, and new entrants were injected into the industry. In consequence of the resultant
turmoil, government introduced the '80/20 agreement', whereby the original three companies got
80 percent of any increase in TAC, and the remaining 20 percent was used to facilitate the
introduction of new entrants into the fishery.
The Diemont Commission was appointed in 1985 to report on issues pertaining to fishing rights,
and its recommendations that existing rights and agreements be honoured, and a board be set up
to allocate quota, were accepted. The Quota Board, which was established under the Sea Fishery
Act (1988), and first sat in 1990, introduced 25 new participants into the hake industry under the
80/20 agreement. In addition to introducing these new entrants (made possible by increases in
TAC due to stock recovery) , the Board has since allocated hake quota to 38 new entities
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including 28 quotas granted to Trusts (formed to promote economic development in poorer
fishing communities). Quota holders pre-dating 1986 have not received any permanent increase
in quota since the imposition of the Quota Board. The agreement, according to which existing
quota holders would receive 80 percent of any increase in TAC, seems to have been discontinued
by government, due to recent political pressure to incorporate new entrants into the industry (SA
Deep Sea Trawling Industry Association, 1995).
The Inshore Trawl Fishery is a mixed species fishery, with some 17 different species offish
being caught by predominantly smaller vessels than those employed in the deep sea trawl sector.
Commercially, hake and sole (both controlled by TAC and individual quota management) are the
two most important species. Other species are not controlled by TACs, and there is no restriction
on the amount offish that can be caught.
In 1977, when the South East Coast Inshore Fishery was established, there were 42 members
operating in this sector, but due to rationalisation, this number had reduced to 24 members by
1985, ranging from one-boat operators to multiple fleet owners and fish packers. Catching is
done by relatively small vessels of 15 to 22 metres in length in water of up to 110 metres in
depth. The general area of operation is from Kei Mouth in the east to Cape Hangklip in the west
(Diemont Commission, 1986).
Besides the deep sea and inshore trawl fisheries, a number of other companies have made
substantial investments in fish-processing facilities. Before individual quotas for hake and other
white fish species were introduced, unprocessed fish was freely available to independent fish
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processors. But after the introduction of individual quotas, these processors have found it
increasingly difficult to obtain fish.
Applications were made by many of these processors, and five were chosen from among the
applicants. These five companies formed the Independent Fish Processors Association (IFPA)
and were granted 2500 tons of hake quota as well as the by-catch. In terms of an agreement
between the Deep Sea Trawling Industry Association and the IFPA, fish are caught on a
proportional basis by five deep sea fishing companies, and an equivalent of 500 tons is supplied
to each of the independent fish processors (Diemont Commission, 1986).
3.3 Composition of the South African Hake Quota Register
In overview of the historical development of the South African hake industry, it was deemed
necessary to include a present day view of the industry and resultant composition of the 1997
Hake Quota Register (Sea Fisheries' register of all 1997 hake quota recipients).
Table 3.1 demonstrates the industry domination by the pioneer companies mentioned in section
3.2. Irvin and Johnson Ltd. (I&J) and Sea Harvest Corp. (Pty) Ltd. are by far the biggest role
players in the present-day industry, with Marine Products Ltd. (MarPro), Fernpar Fishing
Company and Viking Fishing Company making up the remainder of the companies classified as
'pioneer' companies. These five companies receive approximately 80 percent of the deep sea
trawl sector quota allocation. The IFPA, who's membership has increased to six members since
inception in 1978, receive two percent of the deep sea trawl quota. Tracherus Visserye, receives
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one percent of the deep sea trawl sector allocation, and is composed of seven members who
receive an equal share of quota allocated to the group. 'Former Longliners' include three
companies who were issued experimental quotas to assess the commercial and biological
viability of longlining for hake. 'Other Deep Sea' trawl participant include six small operators
who do not receive enough quota to run economically viable trawling operations. These quota
holders contract out, together with most other quota holders in the deep sea trawl sector, to the
five pioneer companies to harvest their allocation.
New Entrants (1993) resulted from a conscious policy effort to introduce new participants to
the industry. Each of the four members received 1000 tons of hake quota. This allocation was
however reduced in 1997, and their share of the quota market currently stands at three percent.
Another 14 new entrants were allocated 4463 tons of quota (or 319 tons each) in 1996, followed
in 1997 by another 15 new entrants, who received 3773 tons (or 251 tons each). Ironically, the
introduction of 15 new entrants in 1997 meant that past allocations to new entrants, which were
made on equity grounds, had to forfeit part of their allocation to provide quota for reallocation.
A total of 2700 tons of hake was allocated to a Sea Fisheries Longlining Experimental project.
This project was very valuable in identifying some of the problems associated with longlining
for hake, and further expansion of the longlining sector has been put on hold as a result of the
data obtained from this study. The experiment raised questions about the sustainability of the
practice, as a large proportion of mature female fish were caught by the longlines (Japp, 1997).
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A bilateral agreement between the South African and Mozambique governments, allocating
Mozambique 1000 tons of hake, is the last remaining foreign recipient of hake quota. Reserves
of 5000 tons make up the remainder of the 1997 TAC.
Allocation to Community Trusts were discontinued in 1996, in favour of forming more
sustainable co-operatives. This allocation, it appears, was very much a token allocation, as quota
was harvested by pioneer companies who paid the trust for their quota allocation, and the trust
played no further role thereafter.
The Inshore Sector, composed of 11 members, is concentrated along the south eastern coast of
South Africa from Mossel Bay to Port Elizabeth. The pioneer companies I&J, Sea Harvest (in
the form of a subsidiary company) and Viking Fishing also dominate this sector with 42, 24 and
13 percent share of quota allocated to this sector, respectively.
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Table 3.1: A summary of South African hake quota allocations (tons), 1995 - 1997.
Deen Sea Trawl Sector
Pioneer Companies (n = 5)
Independent Fish Prod. Assoc. (IFPA) (n = 6)
Trachurus Visserye (n = 7)
Former Longliners (n = 3)
Other Deep Sea (n = 6)
New Entrants (1993) (n = 4)
New Entrants (1996) (n = 14)
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Source: (Stuttaford, 1997 :13)
3.4 Management of the South African Hake Fishery
3.4.1 Initial Quota Allocation Criteria
It was stated in the Diemont Commission of 1985/6, that quota allocation should not, except in
certain exceptional cases, be made according to past performance. This was to ensure that no
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new entrants were barred from entering the fishery. It however went on to say that allocation
would be on the basis of traditional pro rata participation, which by definition cannot be
separated from a measure which is based on past performance. Current practice, according to
the Sea Fisheries Act of 1988 (based on recommendations by the Diemont Commission),
allocates quota via the Quota Board on grounds of past participation.
The White Paper however proposes radically changing the present system of allocation, to a
tender system, whereby bidders will tender on the criteria of both empowerment and past
participation (Marine Fisheries Policy for South Africa, 1997).
3.4.2 Annual Allocation of TAC: Proportional vs Fixed Tonnage
In 1985/6, the Diemont Commission investigated the feasibility of issuing existing quota rights
on a permanent basis. The need to grant greater security of tenure was however confused with
the problem of allocating a fixed amount of quota for more than one year, ie., a set tonnage which
did not vary annually in line with fish stock fluctuations. The option of a proportional system,
granting quota for a period of longer than one year, did therefore not receive fair consideration
and was as a result not implemented.
Therefore, at present, annual allocation of quota to existing quota holders takes place according
to a fixed tonnage system. From Sea Fisheries' records of the past seven years, it is ascertained
that no major shifts in quota allocation have occurred and increases in TAC have primarily gone
to new entrants. In 1997,15 new entrants received 251 tons each, which was made possible by
the across-the-board four percent reduction in allocation to existing members (See Table 3.1).
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This reduction in allocation was later reversed, but new entrants did not lose their allocation.
Hence pressure has been put on the resource, the effect of which still remains to be seen.
The White Paper states that under optimal management, TAC for the hake sector could rise by
as much as 30 000 to 50 000 tons. This rise in TAC, and the resultant increase in the amount of
quota available for allocation, needs to be thoroughly investigated when deciding whether a
percentage or fixed tonnage system should be adopted.
Under a fixed tonnage system, an increase in TAC can be allocated to new members (by which
ever method the government chooses to approve new applicants), thereby addressing the equity
issue. However, according to this method, the government would be liable for shortfalls in
allocatable TAC resulting from fish stocks fluctuating below the allocated fixed quota allotment.
The State would then be forced to step in and buy-back excess quota from the market, as the New
Zealand government had proposed to do, but later found to be unsustainable and a management
intensive practice. The decision to adopt a fixed tonnage system, with increases in TAC being
allocated to new entrants, might appear to be the short term solution to introducing new members
into the industry, however due to the before-mentioned argument, it is not seen as a viable option.
Under the percentage/proportion of TAC method, two alternatives are available; (1) any
increase in TAC can be distributed amongst all existing quota holders according to the proportion
of TAC held, ie., the same proportion of a larger TAC, or (2) current proportions of TAC held
can remain constant at a fixed tonnage, with the anticipated increase in TAC going to new
entrants. Once the TAC has 'settled' at a long term equilibrium, these proportions of TAC can
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then be entrenched as perpetual proportional allocations. According to this method, the
government would be free of any liability resulting from fish stocks fluctuations.
3.5 Proposed White Paper Reforms to Fisheries' Policy
This section is not intended to evaluate the proposed new policy options, but rather to give an
overview of some of the contentious issues at hand. It was felt that this dissertation would not
be complete without giving the reader an idea of the direction government intended pursuing.
Many reforms to the present policy governing marine fisheries have been proposed by the White
Paper on Marine Resources, published in May 1997. Opposition to the White Paper was
widespread, with various proposed changes being opposed by present quota holders as well as
those intended to benefit from the new policy. The key issues included inter alia the following:
fl) quota will be issued as a percentage of TAC;
(2) quota rights will have to be purchased via a public tender in a once-off bidding process
(the State not being compelled to necessarily accept the highest bid), with the purchase
price, including the cost of managing the resource, being paid annually;
(3) the right will be divisible, transferable and inheritable, with a ceiling on maximum
tonnage associated with a single quota holder;
(4} the right will revert back to the State within the allotted period, for example, a maximum
term of 50 years will revert at a rate of two percent per year, and a minimum term often
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years will revert at a rate often percent per year, ie., the entire quota share purchased will
reverted back to the state over the allotted period, and;
(5) as not all participants may wish to acquire long term rights, provision is made for the
establishment of a commercial public company to enable industry participants to lease
rights for a shorter time period of one or more seasons. The above-mentioned company
will then lease quota to private individuals by holding an auction where rights are
allocated on a 'competitive' basis to bidders who compete on criteria of black economic
empowerment and previous participation in the industry (Marine Fisheries Policy for
South Africa, 1997).
Consensus has not been reached on many of the above-mentioned issues, and reaction to the
White Paper was still ongoing at the time of publication. Many emotional and highly political
issues are raised in the White Paper; however, for any new policy to be successful, equity issues
need to be tackled with sound economic grounding. It was thus felt that this dissertation could





Described in this chapter is the study population, sampling techniques employed to collect data
and methods employed to analyse the data.
4.1 Study Population and Sampling Technique
A register of hake quota holders for the 1997 fishing season was obtained from the Department
of Sea Fisheries. Of the 71 companies and individuals who received quota, 49 separate
operational groups could be distinguished, ie., quota was issued to the same company operating
in different sectors of the fishery, or quota holders joined forces and pooled their quota to form
one operational and managed unit. All 71 members of the register were sampled by means of a
postal survey, and 16 usable responses were returned. The Department of Sea Fisheries also
maintained a register of 275 companies and individuals who unsuccessfully applied for hake
quota for the 1997 fishing season. These 275 applicants were also sampled and 25 usable
responses were returned.
In addition to information received from postal questionnaires, a trip was undertaken to Cape
Town to personally interview personnel of the Department of Sea Fisheries, and authoritative
members of the industry. Meetings were conducted with many staff members at the Department
of Sea Fisheries, from which a great deal of knowledge was gained about the role played by
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biological and administrative staff at the Department. The role of the Quota Board, in allocating
quota to present and perspective quota holders, was also investigated. Meetings with industry
members included, amongst others, the chairman of the Deep Sea Trawling Industry Association
and Small Quota Holders Association. Many conflicting views on present and proposed policy
measures were received, which gave valuable insight into the day-to-day dilemmas faced by
those involved in the industry.
4.2 Data Analysis
Apart from computing descriptive statistics (presented in section 5.1), factor analysis was used
to identify relationships between variables, which describe more clearly the opinions and
preferences of respondents. A discriminant analysis was then used to identify those variables
which best differentiate between present quota holders and applicants (non-quota holders).
Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 provide a brief overview of techniques used, and results are presented in
sections 5.2 and 5.3.
4.2.1 Factor Analysis
4.2.1.1 Aims and Objectives
Factor analysis was used to identify relationships amongst variables representing various
opinions regarding restructuring the hake quota market. Components that could be meaningfully
interpreted, led to a greater understanding of the variation in the data. Factor analysis
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accomplishes this by replacing the set of existing variables with a new set of variables, defined
by a linear combination of the original variables. The factors produced are uncorrelated, ranked
in order of decreasing variance and measure different dimensions in the data (Manley, 1994).
The percentage of variation accounted for is often rather low in studies of this nature, which
reflects the complexity of the underlying structure, in the sense that it is not readily summarised
(Crabtree, 1971)
4.2.1.2 The Component Form
The component is of the form:
PC, = ajIXx + ai2X2 + + aipXp (4.1)
where : X,, X2,... Xp are the original variables
The coefficients an, a ,̂ ...a,p are chosen such that PC, accounts for the greatest share of the
variance (or correlation) in the original p variables as possible (Nieuwoudt, 1977). Use was
made of the correlation matrix and standardised variables since variables consisted of a number
of qualitative and quantitative variables of different units (Steffens, 1983). The use of both
qualitative and quantitative variables does not pose a problem in factor analysis, and factors
obtained provide a plausible low-dimensional representation of data (Gower, 1966; Jolliffe,
1986). The percentage of correlation accounted for by the factor is represented by an eigen value.
Eigen values with values of greater than one were included in the analysis, as they account for
more of the correlation than the original variables. The above criterion was followed in this
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study as it has proved particularly accurate when the number of variables is small (Stevens,
1983).
4.2.2 Discriminant Analysis
4.2.2.1 Aims and Objectives
Discriminant analysis begins with the desire to statistically differentiate between two groups of
individuals, given measurements for individuals on several different variables (Manley, 1994).
In this study, the two groups comprised of those companies that received hake quota, and those
that did not receive quota after application. In order to distinguish between these groups, the
researcher must assemble a set of explanatory or discriminating variables on which the two
groups are expected to differ. Having selected the discriminating variables, the mathematical
objective is to weight and linearly combine the variables so that the groups are forced to be as
statistically distinct from one another as possible (Klecka, 1975).
4.2.2.2 The Discriminant Function Form
The discriminant function is of the form:
Dj = d,z, + d2z2 + + dpzp (4.2)
where : Dj is the i-th respondent's discriminant score on the function
z,... zp are standardised discriminating variables
d, ... dp are coefficients that weight variables in the function
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The coefficients are computed so as to maximise the ratio of the variance of D between the two
groups relative to the variance of D within groups. The index D is an optimum linear
discriminator between the groups. The relative contribution of each discriminating variable to
the discriminating function is determined by the magnitude of its associated coefficient. The
standardised coefficients (dp) reflect the relative importance of the independent variable (zp).
Independent variables with relatively larger (dp) contribute most to the discrimination between
the two groups (Klecka, 1975). The sign of the coefficient indicates whether the variable is
positively or negatively related to D. In this study, variables which did not add to the
discriminating power of the function were discarded using a stepwise procedure. The idea is to
exclude variables which do not make a significant contribution to the separation between groups.
4.2.2.3 Measurement of the Discriminating Power of the Function
Once a discriminant function has been estimated, it is necessary to assess its discriminating
power. The function's eigen value is a direct measure of its discriminating power, ie. the greater
the eigen value, the better the discriminating power of the function. Wilks' lambda is inversely
related to the eigen value and provides a basis for testing the statistical significance of the
function. A low value for Wilks' lambda implies better explanatory power. The explanatory
power of a discriminant function can also be gauged by comparing its classification of sample
cases with actual group membership.
Analysis refers to the interpretation of the original data, and to the interpretation of the
discriminant function. The F-test can be used to check whether or not individual discriminating
variables contribute to the separation of groups (quota holders and applicants). This test is valid
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only if the explanatory variables are multivariate normally distributed. In practice, however, this
technique is very robust. Violation of the assumptions do not render the analysis useless. If the
discriminant scores are univariately normally distributed for each group, the analysis is still
statistically reliable (Truett et al, 1967:521). In practice, this assumption can also be checked
by observing the distribution of discriminant scores (Dj), estimated for each group. If the
distribution is approximately normal, the test is considered valid. The degree of overlap in the
distributions plotted for each group also provides a visual measure of the function's explanatory
power. The smaller the overlap, the better the function.
4.2.2.4 Variables Considered in the Discriminant Analysis
Variables expected to discriminate between quota holders and applicants are presented in Table
4.1 and discussed in this section. A dependent variable DISCRIM was constructed using one
(1) for applicants who applied for hake quota for the 1997 fishing year, but did not receive any,
and zero (0) for existing quota holders who received quota for the 1997 season.
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Table 4.1: Definition of variables included in the discriminant analysis.
Variable Definition
DISCRIM = 1 for non-quota holders (applicants) and 0 for quota holders.
AUCTION1 = 1 if respondent agrees with the auctioning of quota to
everyone, 0 otherwise.
G/FATHER = 1 if respondent agrees with issuing quota according to past
performance, 0 otherwise.
GRADUAL = 1 if respondent agrees with a gradual decrease in quota
allocation to existing quota holders, 0 otherwise.
FREE = 1 if respondent agrees with issuing quota to new entrants free
of charge, 0 otherwise.
PREPRICE = 1 if respondent agrees with issuing quota to new entrants at a
predetermined price, 0 otherwise.
AUCTION2 = 1 if respondent agrees with the auctioning of quota to new
entrants, 0 otherwise.
PAPER_Q = 1 if respondent agrees with the allocation of'paper' quota, 0
otherwise.
LEASE = 1 if respondent agrees with allowing new entrants to lease
quota to other companies, 0 otherwise.
Auctioning quota to everyone (AUCTION!)
It was tested whether quota holders would oppose (support) and applicants support (oppose)
government intentions to implement a payment system to capture rents generated by the hake
industry. It was expected that existing quota holders who have received quota free of charge in
the past, would not be willing to pay for quota. Rejected applicants, wishing to gain access to
the fishery, were also not expected to support payment. However, since they are unable to
acquire quota via present allocation channels, they may support auctioning, as this would ensure
free and open access to all those aspiring to join the industry. AUCTION 1 equals 1 if
respondent agrees with statement, 0 otherwise.
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Grandfathering fG/FATHER^
It was hypothesised that grandfathering would be opposed by applicants who feel they have
previously been unjustly overlooked for quota allocation. Present quota holders on the other
hand were expected to support grandfathering. G/FATHER equals 1 if respondent agrees with
grandfathering, 0 otherwise.
Gradual decrease in quota allocation to existing quota holders (GRADUAL*)
Applicants were expected to oppose a gradual change to the present allocation structure in pursuit
of a rapid redistribution of quota to those 'previously excluded'. A gradual decrease in quota
allocation was however expected to be favoured by existing quota holders who wish to see the
inevitable redistribution of quota take place without too much disruption to the quota market.
Many existing quota holders have voluntarily held back on past catches and invested heavily in
exploring new resources for the future. They would therefore like to recapture some of their
investment before quota is reallocated. GRADUAL equals 1 if respondent agrees with
statement, 0 otherwise.
Allocate quota to new entrants free of charge CFREÊ )
Allocating quota to new entrants free of charge was expected to be favoured by applicants and
opposed by existing quota holders. FREE equals 1 if respondent agrees with statement, 0
otherwise.
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Allocate quota to new entrants at a predetermined price (PREPRICE)
Allocating quota to new entrants at a predetermined price (seen as a proxy for making new
entrants pay for quota), was expected to be favoured by quota holders and opposed by applicants.
New entrants were not expected to support a system whereby they pay for a resource which
existing quota holders have received free of charge in the past. PREPRICE equals 1 if
respondent agrees with statement, 0 otherwise.
Allocate quota to new entrants by means of an auction (AUCTI0N2)
The present system of allocating quota to new entrants free of charge results in many individuals
applying for (and receiving) quota which they have no intention of using. This results in new
entrants on-leasing the quota to an established operator, who benefits from the economies of size
derived from the extra quota. Auctioning quota to new entrants would result in only those
individuals with a genuine intention of utilising quota bidding for it. This quota would therefore
not be available to existing quota holders to lease. Existing quota holders were therefore
expected to oppose the auctioning of quota to new entrants. Applicants, on the other hand, were
expected to support the auctioning of quota. It was reasoned that with only a very slim chance
of receiving quota (only 15 of 290 applicants in 1997 received quota), auctioning would allow
them greater access to a fishery previously only accessible to a privileged few who were
bureaucratically issued with quota. AUCTION2 equals 1 if respondent agrees with statement,
0 otherwise.
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Issuing o f paper' quota (PAPER_O)
The issuing of 'paper' quota was hypothesised to be supported by applicants, but opposed by
present quota holders. There are presently individuals who have received 'token' allocations of
quota, although they may not have any intention of utilising it. It was hypothesised that within
the set of applicants there may be those who hope to benefit from this present weakness in the
allocation system. PAPER_Q equals 1 if respondent agrees with statement, 0 otherwise.
Allow new entrants to lease their quota to other companies (LEASE)
Quota allocated to new entrants was examined separately to quota allocated to existing quota
holders. It was hypothesised that existing quota holders would oppose a system where quota was
reallocated to new entrants (at the expense of existing quota holders), simply to be leased back
by existing members at a windfall gain to the new entrant. New entrants on the other hand, were
expected to support leasing quota to other companies. This could be for one of two reasons; (1)
new entrants wish to make a windfall gain from a 'token' allocation of quota (often allocated
with the aim of empowerment), and (2) those new entrants with a genuine intention of using their
allocation may need time to get operations up and running, and as a result, on-lease their quota
to other companies until such a time as they are in a position to utilise it themselves. LEASE




This chapter begins with statistics reflecting the size and geographical position of respondents.
This was done with the intention of giving the reader some indication of the nature and location
of respondent operations. This is followed by an examination of data contrasting responses
received from present quota holders and rejected applicants. Results obtained from the factor and
discriminant analysis are then presented, followed by a section aimed at estimating the rent
generated by the hake fishery.
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
5.1.1 Respondent Characteristics: Size and Location
Respondents were clustered around the Western Cape (See Table 5.1), with 56 percent of quota
holders situated west of Cape Town, 25 percent in Cape Town, six percent in Mossel Bay, and
13 percent east of Mossel Bay. Forty-eight percent of applicants were situated west of Cape
Town, 12 percent in Cape Town, 20 percent between Cape Town and Mossel Bay, four percent
in Mossel Bay, eight percent east of Mossel Bay and eight percent of applicants who responded
were not from coastal areas. Most deep sea trawling companies were situated in an area around
Cape Town and extending up the west coast as far as Saldana Bay, while the majority of
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companies operating in the inshore trawl sector are situated east of Cape Town, and clustered
around Mossel Bay.
Table 5.1: Geographical location of respondents, 1997.
Location of Respondent
West of Cape Town
Cape Town
Cape Town to Mossel Bay
Mossel Bay


































Data revealed the size of allocations differed vastly amongst quota holders, the breakdown of
which can be seen in Table 5.2. Three respondents received less than 200 tons, eight between
200 and 499 tons, two between 500 and 999 tons, and three in excess of 1000 tons. Those
companies receiving in excess of 1000 tons were the pioneer companies mentioned in sections
3.2 and 3.3, three of which replied to the questionnaire. Not only do these companies dominate
quota allocation, but they dominate harvesting to an even greater extent, harvesting 87 percent
and 85 percent of the total hake catch in 1995 and 1996 respectively (Department of Sea
Fisheries, 1997).
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Table 5.2: Size of quota allocations to existing holders, 1997.
Size of Allocation
0- 199 tons
200 - 499 tons
500 - 999 tons
1000 +tons











5.1.2 Fixed Tonnage vs Proportional Allocation
Fifty percent of quota holders (n = 16) indicated quota should be allocated as a percentage of
TAC, whereas 83 percent of applicants (n = 23) advocate a fixed tonnage system, where tonnage
allocated does not vary from year to year in line with fish stock fluctuations. Applicant support
for a fixed tonnage system may be representative of a minimum threshold tonnage, below which
small operators would not survive the ill-effects of poor years.
A question relating to the minimum economically viable quota size was therefore posed to
applicants and responses ranged from 200 tons to 5000 tons (mean = 1423 tons and median =
1000 tons) (n = 14) for trawling and 100 tons to 2000 tons (mean = 468 tons and median = 375
tons) (n = 14) for longlining. Applicants also envisaged the minimum start-up capital required
for an economically viable trawling and longlining operation to range from R250 000 to R5 000
000 (mean = R2 070 833 and median = R2 250 000) (n = 13) for a trawling operation, and R50
000 to R2 000 000 (mean = R625 333 and median = R400 000) (n = 15) for a longlining
operation (See Table 5.3).
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Table 5.3: Applicant opinion on minimum trawling and longlining quota and capital
requirements, 1997.





















Quota holders and applicants stated a preference for quota with a longer term of tenure, with only
ten percent of all respondents (n = 29) supporting the present one year tenure period (Table 5.4).
Preference for a longer tenure period can be attributed to large investments in resource
assessments, harvesting and processing equipment, and marketing infrastructure and networks.
Table 5.4: Quota holder and applicant opinion on tenure period, 1997.
Tenure period
In perpetuity
11 to 30 years
6 to 10 years
2 to 5 years
1 year
Quota Holders Applicants

























5.1.4 Accumulation of Quota for Reallocation
Opinions regarding the accumulation of quota for reallocation to new entrants are presented in
Table 5.5. Sixty-two percent of quota holders and 61 percent of applicants support rapid
reallocation of quota (within five years). It was reasoned that applicants would opt for rapid
reallocation, while existing quota holders would opt for a gradual change from the present quota
allocation structure from which they benefit. These figures, however, seem to indicate the
contrary.
Table 5.5: Quota holder and applicant opinion on methods of accumulating quota for reallocation
to new entrants, 1997.
Method of Accumulating Quota for Reallocation
Quota Holders
(n=16)
II f r e q 1 %
Once-off percentage decrease
Percentage decrease over 1 to 5 years
Percentage decrease over 6 to 10 years



















5.1.5 Self-utilisation of Quota Allocation
According to Table 5.6 (a five category scale ranging from 'strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree'
with the statements given, was used to elicit the intensity of respondents' opinions), 94 percent
of quota holders (n = 16) and 88 percent of applicants (n = 25) support the self-utilisation of
quota by everyone being a prerequisite for allocation. Self-utilisation by new entrants only was
supported by all quota holders (n = 16) and 84 percent of applicants (n = 25). This concept,
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which is again advocated by the White Paper, has been policy in the past, but has not always been
strictly enforced. Attitudes towards the issuing of 'paper' quota (quota not utilised directly by
holder), which is in essence the opposite of self-utilisation, were therefore also examined, and
opposed by all quota holders (n = 16) and 68 percent of applicants (n = 25). This further
emphasises support for the enforcement of self-utilisation.
Table 5.6: Quota holder and applicant opinion on self-utilisation, 1997.
Statement
Government regulation, where
government or allocation board
issues quota to quota holders who
must utilise quota themselves in
order to qualify for allocation.
Allocate quota to new entrants, but
they have to utilise quota







































5.1.6 Auctioning of Quota
Eighty-eight percent of quota holders and 85 percent of applicants opposed auctioning quota to
everyone, while auctioning quota to new entrants only was opposed by 69 % of quota holders
and 88 % of applicants (Table 5.7). With the slim chance of an applicant receiving quota (five
percent in 1997), it was reasoned that applicants would prefer an auctioning system where access
was open and free. These figures suggest that White Paper proposals to implement a bidding
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system, where small operators may purchase rights on a short term basis, may encounter
resistance.
Table 5.7: Quota holder and applicant opinion on auctioning, 1997.
Statement
Auction quota to everyone.



































5.2 Results of Factor Analysis
Fourteen variables representing varying opinions on restructuring were included in the factor
analysis. Four factors, having eigen values greater than one, and accounting for 67.9 percent of
the variation in the data, were retained. Results of the analysis are presented in Table 5.8.
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Auction quota to everyone (0 = Disagree; 1 = Agree)
Grandfathering (0 = Disagree; 1 = Agree)
Lower initial purchase price, followed by higher annual levies (0 = Disagree; 1 = Agree)
Gradual decrease in quota allocation to existing quota holders (0 = Disagree; 1 = Agree)
Allocate quota to new entrants free of charge (0 = Disagree; 1 = Agree)
Allocate quota to new entrants at a predetermined price (0 = Disagree; 1 = Agree)
Allocate quota to new entrants by means of auction (0 = Disagree; 1 = Agree)
Issuing of 'paper' quota (0 = Disagree; 1 = Agree)
Regulated quota transfer market for everyone (0 = Disagree; 1 = Agree)
Allow new entrants to lease their quota to other companies (0 = Disagree; 1 = Agree)
Allow new entrants to lease their quota only to control body (0 = Disagree; 1 = Agree)
Fixed tonnage system (0 = Disagree; 1 = Agree)
Labour employed (Number of employees)

















































































The first factor represents a set of respondents, defined as applicants, or those respondents
unable to join the industry under present policy. This factor accounted for 24.0 percent of total
variation in the data (Table 5.8) and gave high factor loadings to opinions viewed strongly by
these members. Applicants seemed concerned with having to compete with established business
for quota, therefore opposing any form of payment for quota. Applicants also opted for a rapid
change to a less regulated system of allocating quota, where quota is also allocated as a fixed
tonnage as opposed to a proportion of TAC (Table 5.9).
Table 5.9: [First Factor] Applicants' attitudes towards aspects of restructuring.
Support:
1) the free issuing of quota to new entrants
2) a fixed tonnage system of allocation
Oppose:
1) grandfathering
2) allocating quota to new entrants at a
predetermined price
3) auctioning quota to everyone
4) auctioning quota to new entrants only
5) a gradual reduction in quota allocation to
existing quota holders
6) allowing new entrants to lease quota only
to relevant control body
The second factor accounted for 19.8 percent of total variation in the data (Table 5.8), and
assigned high factor loadings to opinions viewed strongly by quota holders. These are
respondents who have received quota in the past according to historical performance. They do
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not wish to see quota reallocated amongst an uncontrollable number of smaller operators who
often do not have the resources to efficiently utilise their allocation. Hence, the strong support
for self-utilisation and the introduction of payment for quota by new entrants, demonstrated by
this group. Opposition to auctioning quota to everyone was expected as these respondents have
received quota free of charge in the past (Table 5.10).
Table 5.10: [Second Factor] Quota holders' attitudes towards aspects of restructuring.
Support: Oppose:
1) issuing quota to new entrants at a 1) auctioning to everyone
predetermined price 2) the issuing of 'paper' quota
2) auctioning quota to new entrants only
3) the self-utilisation of quota allocation
The third factor, representing smaller scale respondents, accounted for 12.7 percent of the total
variation in the data (Table 5.8). This group, comprising of small quota holders and applicants.
are unhappy with the present imbalance in the quota market. They wish to see a rapid change to
the present allocation mechanism and structure, where those wishing to obtain quota, either for
the first time, or to expand their present size of operation (in the case of current quota holders),
could do so in an open and free market (Table 5.11).
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Table 5.11: [Third Factor] Small scale respondents' attitudes towards aspects of restructuring.
Oppose:
1) allocating quota to new entrants at a predetermined price
2) a gradual reduction in quota allocation to existing quota holders
3) regulated quota transfer markets
The fourth factor represents larger and longer established quota holders, and accounts for 11.3
percent of the total variation in the data (Table 5.8). These respondents seem concerned with the
threat of sudden reductions in quota allocation and proposed methods of payment for quota.
These companies have received large allocations of quota in the past, and are therefore concerned
with the impact restructuring might have on employment and international market share and
competitiveness. Opposition to regulated quota transfer markets was also expected (Table 5.12).
Table 5.12: [Fourth Factor] Larger and longer established quota holders' attitudes towards
aspects of restructuring.
Support: Oppose:
1) a gradual reduction in quota allocation to 1) regulated quota transfer markets
existing quota holders
2) lower initial purchase price of quota, followed
by higher annual levies
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5.3 Results of Discriminant Analysis
A discriminant analysis was undertaken to determine which opinions were associated with, and
distinguished between, existing quota holders (coded as 0) and applicants (coded as 1). Results
of the discriminant analysis are presented in Tables 5.13 and 5.14.
Table 5.13: Estimated discriminant function distinguishing between quota holders (0) and
applicants (1).
Explanatory Variable
Issuing quota according to past
performance (G/FATHER)
Issuing quota to new entrants at a
predetermine price (PREPRICE)
Allowing new entrants to lease quota to
other companies (LEASE)


















All signs were according to a priori expectations, with the main variable discriminating between
quota holders and applicants being G/FATHER, allocating quota according to past performance
(Table 5.13). The second most important variable was PREPRICE, allocating quota to
applicants at a predetermined price. The importance of this variable was seen to demonstrate the
contradicting opinion on new entrants having to pay to enter the market. LEASE, allowing new
entrants to lease their quota share to other companies, was the third most important
discriminating variable, and PAPER_Q, the allocation of 'paper' quota was the fourth most
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important discriminating variable. The inclusion of these last two discriminating variables in the
function is evidence of the opposing views held by current quota holders and those individuals
attempting to join the industry on self-utilisation and token allocations of quota.
The overall F-value (F = 18.23) indicates the four independent variables retained together
significantly discriminate between quota holders and applicants. A Wilks' lambda of 0.318 and
a canonical correlation coefficient of 0.826, indicate the function is effective in classifying
respondents correctly. The percentages of correctly classified results are (Table 5.14): 93.8
percent of quota holders, 96.0 percent of applicants and 95.1 percent of overall cases.

















No permanent transfers of quota have taken place in recent years, however rental transfers are
common (Fourie, 1997). Quota holders indicated that 1997 quota was renting for prices ranging
from R1.75/kg to R1.90/kg (mean = R1.84/kg) (n = 8), a figure which is consistent with
information received from telephonic and personal interviews conducted with industry members
(See Figure 5.1, distance BC). This figure combined with 151 701 tons of hake allocated in 1997
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(distance OG), amounts to R279 million in annual hake quota rents (area ABCD). Figure 5.1 is



















^ " \ ^ VAP
151701 tons
Quantity of Hake Quota (tons)
Figure 5.1: Demand for hake quota and quota rents in South Africa, 1997.
The difference between private ownership and common ownership of a resource is demonstrated
in Figure 5.1. The optimal level of utilisation from society's point of view (OG), occurs under
private ownership where (marginal cost) MC = VMP (value of marginal product). At this point,
an additional unit of cost yields an equivalent unit of revenue. It is not known whether the
current allocation of 151701 tons is more or less than the optimum level (OG in Figure 5.1). For
illustrative purposes this quota allocation is shown at the optimum level in Figure 5.1, with quota
rent being the vertical difference between the VAP and VMP curves. In the absence of control,
the open access (or uncontrolled common ownership) result prevails, where MC = VAP (value
of average product), and 01 units of the resource are harvested. At this point, no individual
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harvester is able to extract any share of rent generated by an efficiently managed fishery, and
therefore has no incentive to conserve the resource by reducing harvesting effort. Consequently,
an open access fishery will over time gravitate towards point I, which may be beyond the
maximum sustainable yield, point H (Doeringer and Terkla, 1995).
Quota rents calculated in Figure 5.1 of R279 million are high when compared to the estimated
1997 landed value of hake of R658 million. Campbell (1990), when dealing with the southern
bluefin tuna fishery in Australia, puts forward the idea of over-capitalisation as a possible reason
for high quota prices. By virtue of the capital intensive nature of the hake fishery, large
quantities of quota are vital to warrant the substantial investment in deep sea trawlers and
processing equipment. Companies presently involved in renting quota attach a low opportunity
cost to equipment and trawlers purchased under past legislation, when the resource was seen to
be growing and access appeared secure. With new developments threatening the viability of past
investments, present operators, specifically the five pioneer companies, are having to operate at
slim margins, when purchasing quota, in order to survive.
It has been mentioned that the White Paper proposes capturing rents generated by fisheries'
resources by instituting a tender system, whereby potential buyers tender for quota on the grounds
of economic empowerment and past participation. A free and open tender system would be
successful in capturing these rents, but it is not known how government will weight the criteria
of economic empowerment against past participation. If a large weight is attached to
empowerment, not all the rents may be captured by this tender system. The State, and country
as a whole, will in this case, be forfeiting potential income from a resource which has been
declared a national asset.
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Auctioning quota to the highest bidder on the other hand (as opposed to an untransparent tender
system), would ensure that quota was purchased by the highest valued user. This would in-turn
ensure that tax revenues accruing to the State are maximised, while at the same time ensuring that
international market shares are not compromised by fluctuations in the supply of hake. Equity,
an equally important consideration, can then be addressed from an economically stable base.
Those who may not have the capital to operate in this capital intensive market, can then also
share in the taxable profits derived from a stable industry. Other measures, such as imposing
ceilings on the maximum tonnage associated with a particular quota holder, included in the
White Paper, can be used to avoid any monopolistic practises distorting the market. Funds raised
in strong stable fisheries, such as hake, can then be used to assist more sensitive and vulnerable
fisheries (often inshore fisheries), characterised by easier access in both physical and economic




This chapter emphasises the policy implications of the empirical findings, and suggests possible
ways in which a new fisheries' policy might meet economic efficiency criteria, while at the same
time giving consideration to aspects of equity.
Results of a factor analysis suggest that both quota holders and applicants support a rapid
redistribution of quota. This may be due to the fact that responses from quota holders are
dominated by small to medium size operators, who constitute the majority of the quota register,
but only receive a small proportion of the quota (See Table 3.1). Data show this subset, together
with applicants, to be unsatisfied with the substantial proportion of quota presently held by a few
large companies. Results therefore seem to indicate that policy makers have the support of all
existing quota holders to reallocate quota to smaller operators. However, special consideration
needs to be given to companies currently holding quota, who voluntarily held back on past
catches to allow stocks to recover, and have invested heavily in exploring the viability of new
resources for future harvesting. These companies should not be penalised for their efforts, and
any policy should take into account any past conservation and investment (Department of
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 1996).
Longer tenure periods proposed by the White Paper, are seen as a positive step forward, and
are in line with international trends to allocate quota encompassing a broader spectrum of rights.
The intentions to have quota revert back to the State over the specified period of the right may
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however need further examination. It is felt that the beneficial effects of a longer period of tenure
might be eroded by this practice, hence retarding potential investment in the future productivity
of the resource.
Applicants' support for a fixed tonnage system, as opposed to a variable or proportional system
of allocation, may reflect that a minimum threshold quota size exists, below which small
operators cannot survive the adverse effects of bad years. Larger, established companies may on
the other hand be more capable of absorbing these potential losses. Having a dual system of
allocating quota, some as a fixed tonnage and some as a proportion of TAC, may be impractical
from a management perspective. The plight of those issued with an allocation below an
economically viable quota size will therefore need further attention and investigation.
Self-utilisation has been a prerequisite for allocation under previous policy, yet this rule has not
been stringently enforced in the past. Self-utilisation is however an inefficient management
technique, as quota is by definition not transferable. If quota is grandfathered according to the
criteria of recipients having utilised the resource in the past, or having the resources required to
utilise it in the future, or if quota is auctioned, there seems to be no reason to impose self-
utilisation. Transferability should be encouraged as it promotes the efficient utilisation of
resources. The practice of issuing token allocations of 'paper' quota, issued on the pretence of
empowerment, to individuals who may not have the resources to utilise it, is in fact at the root
of concern regarding transferability. Issuing quota to individuals who are unable to utilise it
themselves and therefore simply lease their allocation to established businesses, is not seen as
an effective means of economic empowerment.
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Individuals surveyed and interviewed indicated that the introduction of a culture of payment for
a resource that has been utilised free of charge for so many years, is going to be a difficult task.
Tendering and auctioning quota have been suggested as the chosen methods of extracting rents
generated by fisheries' resources. These methods are successful in extracting rents. On the other
hand, if an excess of State invention results in quota transferring to inefficient and ill-equipped
users, then these methods will result in the perpetuation of the present system, involving
excessive transaction costs, as quota is traded annually between those in possession of quota and
those in possession of the assets and knowhow to best utilise it (to the benefit of the economy as
a whole). Purchasing quota will however be an expensive process, and policy makers may
therefore have to find methods to financially assist new entrants as well as current quota holders.
White Paper proposals of issuing quota according to criteria of both economic empowerment and
past performance may also have to be clarified, so as to ease the concerns of both existing quota
holders, who are worried about losing their historical quota share, and applicants who are
concerned about being outbid by established companies already active in the hake fishery.
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CONCLUSIONS
Imposing upper limits on catches, access restriction (license), input restrictions and taxes are
unsuccessful at maximising rents generated by fisheries' resources. Leading international fishing
nations, including New Zealand, Australia, Iceland, Chile and Norway have therefore pursued
an individual transferable quota (ITQ) management regime. Much insight has been gained from
the experiences of these countries, most of whom have adopted similar methods of management,
involving allocating proportional allotments of quota, free of charge and in perpetuity. These
allotments are divisible, fully transferable and inheritable.
Management methods employed by the South African hake fishery presently exhibit many
similar characteristics to those used by these leading fishing nations. Present management
methods, however, are soon to change according to the White Paper on Marine Fisheries Policy
(1997). Many aspects of restructuring, however, have not been well accepted by the fishing
industry.
Factor analysis of data collected identified four factors, representing groups of respondents
defined as (1) applicants (individuals who's applications for 1997 hake quota were rejected), (2)
quota holders (present 1997 hake quota holders), (3) small scale respondents (comprising of both
quota holders and applicants), and (4) larger, longer established quota holders. These factor
groupings all shared similar opinions on restructuring and offered valuable insight into what
present industry members and those attempting to join the industry wished to see from the new
fisheries' policy.
71
Applicants' concerns seemed to centre around issues of competing with established quota holders
for quota. For this reason, 85 percent of applicants opposed the auctioning of quota to everyone
(both present quota holders and applicants), and 88 percent opposed auctioning quota to new
entrants only. Sixty-one percent of applicants sought a rapid (within five years) change to the
present quota allocation structure, where a few large companies receive the vast majority of
annual quota. It was also found that present small scale quota holders share this view, with 62
percent of quota holders favouring the rapid reallocation of quota. A fixed tonnage system was
advocated by applicants, with 83 percent of applicants opting for this system as opposed to a
variable, or proportional, system of allocating annual TAC.
Quota holders, on the other hand, seemed more concerned with issues of self-utilisation. All
quota holders favoured self-utilisation by new recipients of quota, and 94 percent supported self-
utilisation by everyone. All quota holders also opposed the issuing of 'paper' quota. Issues of
self-utilisation, however, seem to stem from concerns surrounding new entrants being issued
token allocations of quota without the resources to utilise it.
Analysis also revealed a further group of respondents defined as larger, longer established quota
holders. Their primary concern seemed to be possible sudden reductions in quota allocation, and
proposed methods of payment for quota. These companies have been receiving quota free of
charge in the past, and are therefore concerned with the impact that redistribution and payment
might have on employment and international competitiveness. Opposition to regulated quota
transfer markets was also expressed by this group.
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Discriminant analysis showed that the most important discriminating variable, distinguishing
between quota holders and applicants, was grandfathering (the issuing of quota according to past
allocation). This was followed by issuing quota to new entrants at a predetermined price, and
seen to demonstrate the differing opinion on making new entrants pay for quota. Allowing new
entrants to on-lease quota to established companies, and the issuing of 'paper' quota, were third
and fourth respectively, and provide evidence of the opposing views held by applicants and quota
holders on issues of self-utilisation and token allocations.
Hake quota rents estimated at R279 million are high relative to the landed value of hake of about
R658 million. These high rents appear symptomatic of the inflated level of past investment in
the fishery, necessitating large quota allocations to continue economically viable operations. The
high demand for quota from these quarters, together with the current sensitivity of matters
surrounding future allocation criteria, may be causing current quota holders to be reluctant to
relinquish their rights. Extraction of these rents by auction should be examined. Equity
problems could then be addressed at a secondary level, possibly with bureaucratic allocations of




The common ownership problem faced by fisheries' resources leaves policy makers in a position
of having to choose a set of management guidelines, that by virtue of the problem, will have to
restrict access to a resource which belongs to the country as a whole. The biological control
method of implementation of a ceiling on the total allowable catch, can be successful in
combatting biological over-exploitation, but is unsuccessful from an economic point of view.
Other methods including restricting access (in the form of licenses), input restrictions and taxes
have been shown to be ineffective at maximising economic rents generated by fisheries'
resources. Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) have been widely heralded as the future in
fishery management. South Africa's hake fishery is presently run in a very similar manner to
internationally employed ITQ management techniques, but quota lacks fundamental property
rights structures, such as security and durability. Exclusivity is currently effective, but is
threatened by present initiatives to open the fishery up to those 'previously excluded'.
Hake is the most valuable fisheries' species in South Africa, with an estimated landed value of
R658 million in 1997. The fishery is presently managed under an individual quota system, where
total allowable catch (TAC) is set annually and divided up according to past performance,
without recipients of quota having to pay for it. Five companies presently dominate the South
African hake fishery. These five companies (of which two are by far the largest) receive
approximately 80 percent of total hake quota allocated, and harvest in excess of 85 percent of the
annual hake catch. Fundamental restructuring of the South African hake quota market is
however recommended by the White Paper on Marine Fisheries Policy (1997).
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A postal survey was conducted of companies allocated with hake quota for the 1997 fishing
season (71 in all), and 16 responses were returned. Also surveyed were 275 rejected hake quota
applicants, presently attempting to join the industry, of which 25 usable responses were returned.
Survey participants were questioned on aspects of current and future policy, methods of
restructuring and the present level of activity of the quota rental market.
Analysis of data revealed 83 percent of applicants would prefer a fixed tonnage system of
allocation, while 50 percent of quota holders indicated a preference for a proportional system.
Applicants' preference for a fixed tonnage system was attributed to the presence of a minimum
threshold quota size, of 1423 tons and 468 tons for trawling and longlining operations,
respectively, required for an economically viable operation. Applicants also indicated the
minimum start-up capital requirement to be R2 070 833 and R625 333 for trawling and
longlining operations, respectively.
A common sentiment displayed, was for a longer period of tenure, with only ten percent of all
respondents supporting the present one year period of tenure. Preference for a longer period of
tenure can be attributed to large investments in resource assessments, harvesting and processing
equipment, and marketing infrastructure and networks.
Sixty-two percent of quota holders and 61 percent of applicants support a rapid reallocation of
quota (within five years). These figures seem to indicate that both present quota holders and
applicants are unhappy with the current domination of the quota market by the five large
'pioneer' companies.
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Ninety-four percent of quota holders and 88 percent of applicants support the self-utilisation of
quota by everyone, while all quota holders and 84 percent of applicants support self-utilisation
by new entrants only. Responses concerning self-utilisation must be seen in the light of present
legislation, according to which, quota is grandfathered and not auctioned or tendered.
Auctioning of quota to everyone was opposed by 88 percent of quota holders and 85 percent of
applicants, while auctioning to new entrants only was opposed by 69 percent of quota holders and
88 percent of applicants.
Factor analysis of data collected found that distinct differences in attitudes towards restructuring
exists amongst respondents. Four factors, representing groups of respondents defined as, (1)
applicants, (2) quota holders, (3) small scale respondents (composed of both applicants and quota
holders), and (4) larger, longer established quota holders, sharing similar attitudes towards
restructuring, were extracted.
Discriminant analysis identified grandfathering as the most important variable discriminating
between present quota holders and rejected applicants. Allocating quota to new entrants at a
predetermine price, was ranked second, and evidence of opposing views held by applicants and
quota holders regarding new entrants paying for quota. Allowing new entrants to on-lease their
quota to established quota holders, and the issuing of'paper' quota, were ranked third and fourth
respectively, and their inclusion in the function is indicative of opposing sentiments on self-
utilisation and token allocations of quota.
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A substantial annual rent of approximately R279 million is generated by the South African hake
industry (1997), which is presently harvested free of charge by those issued with quota. It is
stated policy of the White Paper to capture these rents, however methods of accomplishing this
need to be more clear and comprehensive. Extraction of these rents by the State through
auctioning should be considered, while some quota could be allocated to poor communities. The




ANNALA, J.H. (1996). New Zealand's ITQ System: Have the First Eight Years Been a Success
or a Failure? Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries, Vol 6: 43-62.
ARNASON, R. (1990). Minimum Information Management in Fisheries. Canadian Journal of
Economics, Vol 23(3): 630-653.
ARNASON, R. (1992a). Theoretical and Practical Fisheries Management. World Bank
Discussion Paper, No. 217.
ARNASON, R. (1992b). Fishery Management in Iceland. World Bank Discussion Paper, No.
217.
ARROW, K.J. (1985). The Potentials and Limits of the Market in Resource Allocation. In:
Feiwel, G.R. (Editor). Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare. McMillan Press,
New York.
BARDHAN, P. (1989). Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Institutions in Economic
Development. In : Bardhan, P. (Editor). The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions. Oxford
University Press, New York.
BARZEL, Y. (1989). Economic Analysis of Property Rights. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
78
BERGH, M.O. and BARKAI, A. (1993). The Management and Utilisation of South Africa's
Living Marine Resources: Principles, Concepts and Policy Options. Unpublished Paper,
Department of Zoology, University of Cape Town, Cape Town.
BOYD, R.O. and DEWEES, CM. (1991). Putting Theory into Practice: Individual Transferable
Quotas in New Zealand Fisheries. Society and Natural Resources, Vol 5: 179-198.
BROMLEY, D.W. and COCHRANE, J.A. (1994). Understanding the Global Commons.
Working Paper 13, the Environmental and Nature Resources Policy and Training Project.
University of Wisconsin-Madison.
BUCHANAN, J.M. (1986). Liberty, Market, and State. Political Economy in the 1980's.
Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton.
BUCHANAN, J.M. (1991). The Economics and Ethics of Constitutional Order. Ann Arbour
Microfilms International. University of Michigan Press, Michigan.
CAMPBELL, D. and HAYNES, H. (1990). Resource Rent in Fisheries. Discussion Papers of
the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, November 1990.
Commonwealth Government Printer. Canberra.
CASSIDY, P.A. (1973). Commonality, Fishery Resources, Potential and Policy: Comment.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol 55(3): 526-529.
79
CHRISTY, F.T. (1973). Fisherman Quotas: A Tentative Suggestion for Domestic Management.
Occasional Paper 19, University of Rhode Island, Law of Sea Institute, Kingston, Rhodes Island.
COASE, R.H. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 3: 1-44.
COASE, R.H. (1988). The Firm, the Market and the Law. University of Chicago Press,
Chigago.
COMMONS, J.R. (1931). Institutional Economics. American Economic Review, Vol 21: 648-
657.
CRABTREE, J.R. (1971). An Assessment of the Relative Importance of Factors Affecting
Criteria of Successes in Dairy Farming using Component Analysis, The Farm Economist, Vol
12: 17-30.
CROTHERS, S. (1988). Individual Transferable Quotas: the New Zealand Experience.
Fisheries, Vol 13: 10-12.
CRUTCHFIELD, J.A. (1961). An Economic Evaluation of Alternative Methods of Fishery
Regulation. The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 4: 131 -143.
DAHLMAN, C.J. (1979). The Problem of Externality. The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol
22: 148.
80
DEEP SEA TRAWLING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, (1995). Paper submitted to the Fisheries
Policy Development Committee by the Deep Sea Trawling Industry Association, Cape Town.
DEMSETZ, H. (1967). Toward a Theory of Property Rights. American Economic Review, Vol
57: 347-359.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS AND TOURISM (1996). Review of
Access Rights Options for South Africa. A Final Report of the Access Rights Technical
Committee, appointed by the Fisheries Policy Development Working Committee, Cape Town.
DEPARTMENT OF SEA FISHERIES (1997). Various documents, Cape Town.
DE SWARDT, K. (1998). Personal communication. Department of Sea Fisheries, Cape Town.
DEWEES, CM. (1989). Assessment of the Implementation of Individual Transferable Quotas
in New Zealand's Inshore Fishery. North American Journal of Fisheries Management, Vol 9:
131-139.
DIEMONT COMMISSION (1986). South African Government Press, Pretoria
DOERINGER, P.B. and TERKLA, D.G. (1995). Troubled Waters: Economic Structure,
Regulatory Reform, and Fisheries Trade. First Edition. University of Toronto Press, Toronto.
FOURIE, F. (1997). Personal communication. Department of Sea Fisheries, Cape Town.
81
FURUBOTN, E.G. and RICHTER, R. (1991). The New Institutional Economics: An Assessment.
In the New Institutional Economics. Edited by Furubotn, E.G. and Richter, R. Texas A & M
University Press.
GARDNER, M. (1995). Input Controls vs Rights Based Management: the Political Economy
of Fisheries Management in Atlantic Canada. Aquatic Living Resources, Vol 8: 267-277'.
GORDON, S.H. (1954). The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery.
Journal of Political Economy, Vol 62: 124-132.
GOWER, J.C. (1966). Some Distance Properties of Latent Root and Vector Methods used in
Multivariate Analysis. Biometrika, Vol 53: 325-338.
GRAFTON, Q.R. (1996). Individual Transferable Quotas: Theory and Practice. Reviews in Fish
Biology and Fisheries, Vol 6: 5-20.
GULLARD, J.A. and CORREZ, J.E. (1968). The State of World Fisheries. Food and
Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations. World Food Problems, No. 7, Rome.
HANNESSON, R. (1992a). Fishery Management in Norway. World Bank Discussion Paper,
No. 217.
HANNES SON, R. (1992b). Trends in Fishery Management. World Bank Discussion Paper, No.
217.
82
HARDIN, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, Vol 162: 1243-1248.
HAYAMI, Y. and RUTTAN, V.W. (1985). Agricultural Development: an International
Perspective. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
JAPP, D. (1997). Personal communication. Department of Sea Fisheries, Cape Town.
JOLLIFFE, I.T. (1986). Principal Component Analysis. Springer - Verlag, New York.
KENNEDY, J. and WATKINS, J. (1985). The Impacts on Quotas on Southern Bluefin Tuna
Fishery. Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol 29: 63-83.
KLECKA, W.R. (1975). "Discriminant Analysis". Statistical Package for the Social Sciences.
Second Edition. McGraw-Hill, New York.
KULA, E. (1994). Economics of Natural Resources, the Environment and Policies. Second
Edition. Chapman and Hall, London.
MAJOR, P. (1991). Economics of Fishery Management. Society and Culture: Economic
Perspectives, Vol 1.
MANLEY, B.F.J. (1994). Multivariate Statistical Methods: A Primer. Second Edition.
Chapman and Hall, London.
83
MARINE FISHERIES POLICY FOR SOUTH AFRICA, (1997). White Paper, May 1997,
Pretoria.
MILLER, E.S. (1978). Institutional Economics: Philosophy, Methodology and Theory. The
Social Science Journal, Vol 15: 13-25.
MOLONEY, D.G. and PEARSE, P.H. (1979). Quantitative Rights as an Instrument of
Regulation of Commercial Fisheries. Journal of Fisheries Research Board of Canada, Vol 36:
859-866.
NEHER, P.A. (1996). Fishing Quota Quality and Fishery Performance. Reviews in Fish
Biology and Fisheries, Vol 6: 113-116.
NIEUWOUDT, W.L. (1977). Interrelationships Amongst Efficiency Measures: A Note. Journal
of Agricultural Economics, Vol 28(1): 77-81.
NIEUWOUDT, W.L. (1990). Efficiency of Land Use. Agrekon, Vol 26: 10-14.
NIEUWOUDT, W.L. (1998). Personal Communication. Department of Agricultural Economics,
University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg.
NORTH, D.C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.
Cambridge University Press, New York.
84
PASOUR, E.C. (1990). Agriculture and the State: Market Processes and Bureaucracy. Holmes
and Meier, New York.
PEARSE, P.H. (1991). Building on Progress, Fisheries Policy Development in New Zealand.
Report Prepared for the Minister of Fisheries, Wellington, New Zealand.
PEJOVICH, S. (1990). The Economics of Property Rights: Towards a Theory of Comparative
Systems. Kluwer Academic Publishers, London.
RANDALL, A. (1981). Resource Economics: An Economic Approach to Natural Resource and
Environmental Policy. Grid Publishing Inc. Columbus, Ohio.
RETTIG, R.B. (1984). License Limitation in the United States and Canada: An Assessment.
North American Journal of Fisheries Management, Vol 4: 231-248.
RUNGE, C.F. (1984). Strategic Interdependence Models of Property Rights. American Journal
of Agricultural Economics, Vol 63: 595-606.
RUNGE, C.F. (1985). The Innovation of Rules and the Structure of Incentives in Open Access
Resources. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol 67: 369-376.
RUTTAN, V.W. (1978). Induced Institutional Change. In : Binswanger, H.P. and Ruttan, V.H.
(Editors). Induced Innovation: Technology, Institutions and Development. John Hopkins
University Press, London.
85
SCHOTTER, A. (1981). The Economic Theory of Social Institutions. Cambridge University
Press, New York.
SCOTT, A. (1955). The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership. Journal of Political
Economy, Vol 63: 116-124.
SMITH, V.L. (1968). Economics of Production from Natural Resources. The American
Economic Review, Vol 58: 409-431.
SOUTH AFRICAN COMMERCIAL SEA FISHERIES REVIEW, (1993). Department of
Environmental Affairs, South Africa.
STEFFENS, F.E. (1983). What is Principal Component Analysis ? Proceedings of the Seminar
on Principal Component Analysis in the Atmospheric and Earth Sciences, February 1983,
Pretoria.
STEVENS, J. (1986). Applied Multivariate Statistics for the Social Sciences. Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, New Jersey.
STUTTAFORD, M. (1996). Fishing Industry Handbook, South Africa, Namibia and
Mozambique. Marine Information cc, Cape Town.
STUTTAFORD, M. (1997). Fishing Industry Handbook, South Africa, Namibia and
Mozambique. Marine Information cc, Cape Town.
86
SYMES, D. and CREAN, K. (1995). Privatization of the Commons: the Introduction of
Individual Transferable Quotas in Developed Fisheries. Geoforum, Vol 26: 175-185.
TISDELL, C. (1991). Economics of Environmental Conservation. First Edition. Elsevier
Science Publishers, The Netherlands.
TRUETT, J., CORNFIELD, J. and KANNEL, L.W. (1967). A Multivariate Analysis of the Risk
of Coronary Heart Disease in Framingham. Journal of Chronological Heart Disease, Vol 20:
511-524.
TURVEY, R. (1964). Optimisation and Suboptimisation in Fishery Regulation. American
Economic Review, Vol 54: 64-76.
WATERS, J.R. (1991). Restricted Access vs. Open Access Methods of Management: Towards
More Effective Regulation of Fishing Effort. Marine Fisheries Review, Vol 53: 1-10.




Appendix A: Quota Holder Questionnaire
88











Hake Quota Holder Questionnaire
To be completed bv the principal decision maker with respect to Hake quota received.
This questionnaire and the proceeding study attempts to highlight factors that need to be
considered when choosing between a high level of regulation of the Hake fishery of South Africa,
as opposed to a more free market in quota and the transfer thereof. It also attempts to identify
a price, at which industry feels quota would trade at, as well as examine the attitude of the
industry as a whole towards policies regarding the introduction of new participants into the
industry.
This questionnaire consists of 6 pages (this page included). Please complete AH sections as
accurately as possible. Please return the questionnaire, (even if you have not completed all the
questions), as soon as possible, (but not later than XX/XX/1997).
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SECTION A: Company Characteristics
This section is intended to give a brief overview of the structure of your business operation,
purely to put in perspective the nature and size of firm that is being dealt with.





(* Leave unanswered if you wish to remain anonymous)






How many people does the business employ ?
What productive fishing assets does the company own, and what is their




Make use of hired assets
Other (please specify asset
as well as estimated value)
Value
SECTION B: Level of participation in the Hake industry.
Remember : All questions in the sections below refer to the Hake fishery only !!
This section is intended to get a brief history of the business operation and its level of
participation in the Hake industry.
For how long has the business been a Hake quota holder ? (years)
What was your quota allocation in 1995 ? (tons)
What tonnage of Hake did the business personally harvest of its
1995 quota? (tons)
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What was your quota allocation in 1996 ? (tons)
What tonnage of Hake did the business personally harvest of its
1996 quota? (tons)
What is your quota allocation for 1997 ? (tons)
Do you feel that quota share allocation is too unstable each year for
preharvest decision making ? (Yes/No)
Do you feel that quota should be allocated as a percentage of Total
Allowable Catch (TAC), or as a fixed tonnage ?
* Please tick the appropriate block.
Do you feel you are fully utilizing the equipment you own, given your
present quota allocation ? (Yes/No)
What do you feel is the maximum tonnage you are capable of harvesting at
present ? (tons)
SECTION C: Level of Non-Market Intervention in the Industry.
These questions are asked, to group respondents into one of two groups, namely, those that
would support a single channel, controlled quota transfer market, and those that would prefer
quota transfers to be handled more by the free and open market.
Would you prefer ? :
a) Government regulation, where government or allocation board issues quota, and
recipients must use the quota themselves in order to qualify for allocation.
Percentage
Fixed Tonnage
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
b) Auctioning, where quota is auctioned to everyone, and holders are them permitted to
buy and sell quota freely.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
c) Quotas are initially allocated by government or allocation board to recipients according
to past allocation and holders are then permitted to buy and sell quota freely.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
* Please tick the appropriate block.
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Would you prefer ? :
a) Government controlled quota transfer market, where transfers would have to take place
through relevant control body.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
b) Free to trade quota on open market, without having to deal exclusively through single
channel government control body.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
Would you prefer ? :
a) A system whereby the initial purchase price of the quota was less, coupled with a higher
annual levy.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
b) A system whereby the initial purchase price of the quota was higher, coupled with a
lower annual levy.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
* Please tick the appropriate block.
SECTION D : Transfers of Quota
This section is intended to obtain an idea of the present level of quota transfers within the market
, and identify a price that quota would trade at in a free market.
Did you lease out or rent in any quota in 1997 ? (Yes/No)
If so, how much (tons), and what did you receive/pay for it ?
(R/ton)








When policy changes and quotas are made more freely tradable, do you
intend to sell (all/some) of your present annual quota allocation ?
* Please tick the appropriate block.
If you were to sell, how much would you be willing to accept for your
quota ? :
If you sold it forever. (R/ton)





Would you be willing to pay for extra quota (over and above your present
allocation) ? (Yes/No)
If so, how much would you be willing to pay for extra quota ?
If you bought it forever. (R/ton)
If you rent it for one year only. (R/ton)
If the quota price had to increase by 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%, from the price you quoted
above (for permanent ownership of" extra quota), how much less quota would you buy at
these respective prices ?
25% increase in price
% less quota
50% increase in price
% less quota
75% increase in price
% less quota
100% increase in price
% less quota
Would you support the auctioning of quota ? (Yes/No) (Lots of quota could
be defined for 1 year, 5 years, or what ever period would suite the buyer.)
If you support the auctioning system, what time period would you






SECTION E: Introduction of New Participants
A requirement of the new fisheries policy was to stipulate how it intended to incorporate new
entrants into the fishery. It is the intention of this section to gauge your view on how this should
be accomplished.
How do you feel quota should be allocated to new applicants ?
a) Allocate quota to new entrants by means of allocation board, free of charge.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral
b) Allocate quota to new entrants by means of allocation
Strongly agree Agree Neutral
c) Auction the quota to the highest bidder.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral
Disagree Strongly disagree





* Please tick the appropriate block.
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What do you feel is the best way for new applicants to be incorporated into
the industry ? A 'once-off percentage decrease in allocation to
existing quota holders.
A percentage decrease in allocation to existing quota
holders phased in over a 1 to 5 year period.
A percentage decrease in allocation to existing quota
holders phased in over a 6 to 10 year period.
Other (please specify)
* Please tick the appropriate block.
Which of the following methods do you most support ?
a) Allocate quota to new entrants, and allow them to lease it to other companies.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
b) Allocate quota to new entrants, and only allow them to lease it back to a relevant
controlling body.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
c) Allocate quota to new entrants, but they have to use the quota themselves to qualify for
allocation.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
* Please tick the appropriate block.
Do you support the concept of a 'Paper Quota'* ? (* ie., quota not utilized
directly by holder) (Yes/No)
When new applicants receive quota, how long should they be allowed
before they are 'up-and-running' and using their quota share themselves ?






If quotas were bought or issued and made transferable, do you
feel there should be a 'no-resale'* period, and if so, how long
? (years)
* 'no-resale' period refers to a certain period of time where the quota may not be resold
to make a quick profit by exiting the fishery.
Yes/No Period
Would you like to see the results of this study ? (Yes/No)
THANK YOTI FOR YOTIR PARTICIPATION TN THTS STUDY.
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Appendix B: Applicant Questionnaire
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Hake Quota Applicant Questionnaire
To be completed bv the principal decision maker with respect to the Hake quota applied for.
This questionnaire and the proceeding study attempts to highlight factors that need to be
considered when choosing between a high level of regulation of the Hake fishery of South
Africa, as opposed to a more free market in quota and the transfer thereof. It also attempts to
identify a price, at which industry feels quota would trade at, as well as examine the attitude of
the industry as a whole towards policies regarding the introduction of new participants into the
industry.
This questionnaire consists of 6 pages (this page included). Please complete AH sections as
accurately as possible. Please return the questionnaire, (even if you have not completed all the
questions), as soon as possible, (but not later than XX/XX/1997).
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SECTION A: Company Characteristics
This section is intended to give a brief overview of the intended structure of your business
operation, purely to put in perspective the nature and size of firm that is proposed.
Name of respondent ?
Company's proposed name ?
Company's residential
address, telephone & fax
number ?






* Please tick the appropriate block.
How many people does the business intend employing ?
Are you presently involved in the fishing industry (Yes/No), and if so how ?
Present involvement ?
What productive fishing assets does the proposed company already own,




Make use of hired assets
Value
Other (please specify asset
as well as estimated value)
What productive fishing assets does the proposed company intend investing




Make use of hired assets
Value
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Other (please specify asset
as well as estimated value)
(All questions that follow are asked with reference to the Hake industry only.)
Do you feel that quota should be allocated as a percentage of Total
Allowable Catch (TAC), or as a fixed tonnage ?
* Please tick the appropriate block.







* Please tick the appropriate block.
What do you feel is the maximum tonnage you will be capable of
processing? (tons)
What do you feel is the maximum tonnage you will be capable of
marketing? (tons)
What do you feel is the maximum tonnage you will be capable of
harvesting? (tons)
What fishing method do you intend using to harvest your quota allocation ?
(* Please tick the appropriate block)
Other (please specify)
If you cannot harvest your entire quota, who do you intend getting to







What do you feel is the minimum quota size that would support an
economically viable trawling/longlining operation? (tons)
What do you feel is the minimum start-up capital required for an




SECTION B: Level of Non-Market Intervention in the Industry.
These questions are asked, to group respondents into one of two groups, namely, those that
would support a single channel, controlled quota transfer market, and those that would prefer
quota transfers to be handled more by the free and open market.
Would you prefer ? :
a) Government regulation, where government or allocation board issued quota, and
recipients must use the quota themselves in order to qualify for allocation.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
b) Auctioning, where quotas are auctioned to everyone, and holders are then permitted to
buy and sell quota freely.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
c) Quotas are initially allocated by government or allocation board to recipients according
to past allocation and holders are then permitted to buy and sell quota freely.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
* Please tick the appropriate block.
Would you prefer ? :
a) Government controlled quota transfer market, where transfers would have to take place
through relevant control body.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
b) Free to trade quota on open market, without having to deal exclusively through single
channel government control body.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
Would you prefer ? :
a) A system whereby the initial purchase price of the quota was less, coupled with a higher
annual levy.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
b) A system whereby the initial purchase price of the quota was higher, coupled with a
lower annual levy.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
* Please tick the appropriate block.
SECTION C : Transfers of Quota
This section is intended to obtain an idea of the present level of quota transfers within the
market, and identify a price that quota would trade at in a free market.
If you had to rent in quota, or buy quota forever, what
would you be willing to pay for it ?
If you bought it forever ? (R/kg)






If you were to sell your quota allocation, how much
would you be willing to accept for it ? :
If you sold it forever. (R/kg)





Would you support the auctioning of quota ? (Yes/No) (Bundles of quota
could be defined for 1 year, 5 years, or what ever period would suite the
buyer.)
If an auctioning system were introduced, what time period would you






SECTION D: Introduction of New Participants
A requirement of the new fisheries policy was to stipulate how it intended to incorporate new
entrants into the fishery. It is the intention of this section to gauge your view on how this should
be accomplished.
How do you feel quota should be allocated to new applicants ?
a) Allocate quota to new entrants by means of allocation board, free of charge.
Strongly agree
b) Allocate quota to
Strongly agree
c) Auction the quota
Strongly agree
Agree Neutral
new entrants by means of allocation
Agree Neutral
to the highest bidder.
Agree Neutral
Disagree Strongly disagree





* Please tick the appropriate block.
What do you feel is the best way for new applicants to be incorporated into
the industry ? A 'once-off percentage decrease in allocation to
existing quota holders.
A percentage decrease in allocation to existing quota
holders phased in over a 1 to 5 year period.
A percentage decrease in allocation to existing quota
holders phased in over a 6 to 10 year period.
Wait for the TAC to increase, and then allocate the
increase to new participants
Other (please specify)
* Please tick the appropriate block.
100
Which of the following methods do you most support ?
a) Allocate quota to new entrants, and allow them to lease it to other companies.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
b) Allocate quota to new entrants, and only allow them to lease it back to a relevant
controlling body.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
c) Allocate quota to new entrants, but they have to use the quota themselves to qualify for
allocation.
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree
* Please tick the appropriate block.
Do you support the concept of a 'Paper Quota'* ? (* ie., quota not utilized
directly by holder.) (Yes/No)
When new applicants receive quota, how long should they be allowed
before they are 'up-and-running' and using their quota share themselves ?






If quotas were bought or issued and made transferable, do you
feel there should be a 'no-resale'* period, and if so, how long
? (years)
* 'no-resale' period refers to a certain period of time where the quota may not be resold
to make a quick profit by exiting the fishery.
Yes/No Period
Would you like to see the results of this study ? (Yes/No)
THANK YOT! FOR YOUR PARTTCTPATTON TN THTS STUDY.
